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Abstract 
 
The reform in post-crisis Korean was one of the most comprehensively designed and decisively 
implemented reforms. Though impressed by the quick recovery, many are now raising doubts about 
real changes in the economy, as the result of a cost-benefits analysis: While the business climate is 
more stable and supportive, the economy is now suffering from weak investment and rising 
unemployment. This study views the Korean story as one of “visible success and invisible failure,” 
based on the following findings. 
  
First, while some new laws were enacted and several quantifiable targets met, little progress was 
made in changing institutional conventions, habit and beliefs, such as enhancing transparency in the 
management or trust in labor relations. Second, reform process involved tension between global 
standard and local specificity, which accounts for the mixed results. Third, special interests politics in 
the implementation stage, plus the complexities caused by increasing democratization and 
globalization, has undermined the authorities’ implementation capacity, which accounts for uneven 
outcomes of the reform. While globalization necessitates increasing flexibility, Korean managers are 
now facing much stronger labor unions. The outcome is not a fully flexible but segmented labor 
markets, divided between the core, unionized workers and unorganized periphery workers, and 
between the one over-protected and the other under-protected. Fourth, it is important to have an 
effective system of legislative bargaining to help resolve disputes. Only with this institutional vehicle 
will special interest groups reach some consensus. Korea tried to overhaul its financial system and 
achieve substantial financial liberalization in the early 1990s but those attempts were partly aborted 
and partly distorted, which paved the way for financial crisis in 1997. This was due to the lack of 
clear reform consensus, without which reform is more likely to be aborted or unsuccessful. Fifth, 
implementation problems stem from institutional complementarities and inappropriate sequencing. 
One logical sequence might be banking reform, corporate governance, labor relations, and then finally 
business restructuring.  
 
Now, an emerging question is whether the reform blueprint was right. Post-crisis Korea just tried to be 
more market or Anglo-Saxon model oriented without paying attention to growth potentials. While 
firms have now lowered their debt ratios, they are not borrowing to fund investment. The issue of 
wrong or right blueprint underscores the need to define the reform goal correctly. The goals of reform 
should not just be a move toward market-oriented economy but toward a growth-oriented one/ or pro-
growth market-oriented one.  
 
JEL Classifications: E61 O10 O17 O53 
Key words: economic reform, institutions, global standards. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Once famous for its rapid economic growth and called an East Asian miracle, the Republic of Korea 
became one of the crisis-struck economies. However, the Korean economy also showed one of the 
quickest and strongest turn-around since 1999. While some attribute this recovery to the achievement 
of reform, others still challenge this view and observe that not much has been changed actually.  
 
We consider Korea a very unique country which has experienced, within a very short period of time, 
“everything” from miracle to crisis and stunning turn-around. The Korean case raises two important 
issues. The first issue is how to link the old success regime to the recent crisis. In other words, the 
financial crisis of 1997 has again brought to surface the old debate on the role of market vs. state in 
economic development. On one side is the market-based view that finds that state intervention in 
financial markets (i.e., over-regulation by government and/or crony capitalism) is the culprit for the 
crisis (Summers 1998). On the other side is the statist view that blames the reckless deregulation of 
financial markets inspired by neo-liberalism (Chang 1998, Crotty and Lee 2001, Singh 2002). Given 
this background, there has also come out an effort, the initiative of the World Bank, to reevaluate the 
East Asian Miracle (Stiglitz and Yusuf 2001).  
 
While this first question has been digested in the literature, the second emerging issue is how to 
interpret the post-crisis reform and quick recovery. And we are already seeing some studies (Coe and 
Kim 2002, Hooley and Yoo 2002). But these studies do not investigate the important question of 
whether the Korean growth regime has really changed, whether institutional reform can be done so 
quickly and thoroughly, and whether recovery is really due to the reform. 
 
Examining how Korea’s economic system has been reformed offers an exemplary case study of the 
process and outcome of a reform intended to introduce global standards but conditioned by a 
country’s political economy and initial conditions. This study will examine the role that various 
interest groups (agents) played in the reform and how initial conditions constrained its process and the 
performance of the system that has emerged from that process. Specifically, the study will examine 
the role played by chaebols, bureaucrats, external pressure, and the prevailing ideas on reform and 
liberalization espoused in academia. Thereby, the analysis will reveal the motivating reasons for 
reform initiatives and will identify the factors responsible for the successful and unsuccessful aspects 
of the reforms in Korea. 
 
 
The reform history of Korea can be divided into the following three periods: (1) 1961-79 when 
General (then President) Park Chung Hee effectively ruled the country, starting the process of 
industrialization and rapid economic growth, (2) 1980-97 when the government undertook a number 
of reforms in an attempt to establish a liberal market economy, and (3) the years since the 1997-98 
economic crisis when reforms were undertaken under the IMF auspices.  
 
During the first period Korea pursued a state-led development strategy that put the government in the 
commanding position in resource allocation. It controlled credit allocation, thus directing resource 
allocation and disciplining large corporations to pursue developmental objectives. It also maintained a 
repressive policy toward labor, thus keeping the wage rate close to the shadow price of labor. The 
second period began in 1980 when General Chun Doo Hwan began his presidency (1980-87) upon the 
assassination of President Park in the preceding year. The new governments attempted a paradigmatic 
shift in political economy from state-led development to a more market oriented economy at the 
behest of liberal reform-minded economists. It did not, however, mean that reforms necessarily 
followed the prescriptions of the new paradigm: the course that the actual reforms took was full of 
detours as it was constrained by initial conditions, including institutional legacies, and buffeted by 
pressures from various interest groups. The economic crisis of 1997-98 is a consequence of reforms ill 
conceived and ill carried out in the preceding years and, consequently, understanding the reforms 
undertaken since the crisis requires our understanding the reforms undertaken during the 1980-97 
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period.  
 
In the financial liberalization, we find that the influence of chaebols and the strategic behavior of 
bureaucrats affected and/or manipulated the blueprint of the reform as well as its implementations, as 
predicted by the thesis of economic entrenchment proposed in Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2004). 
In corporate restructuring, we find that initial conditions such as segmented labor markets, high 
premiums for owner-controller of the firm, and so on, affected the course of corporate restructuring, 
and thus the standard Anglo-Saxon blue-print has not realized at its purist form, and/or has not 
worked as originally expected. This is consistent with the argument by Rodrik, Subramanian, and 
Trebbi (2004) that desirable institutional arrangements have a large element of context specificity 
arising from differences in historical trajectories. 
 
As analyzed in Fanelli (2003), questions regarding the reform can be addressed in terms of the 
following. First, why were some countries able to undertake reform while others were not?  Second, 
what factors enabled some countries to successfully implement their reform program while the 
program failed in others?  Third, why were some reforms more successful at delivering the expected 
outcomes than others? 
 
In our attempt to answer these questions, we employ an “analytical narratives” approach that 
combines historical research with theoretical analysis (e.g., Bates et al. 1998, 2000). It is historical in 
that we describe and examine in temporal sequence the institutions and changes in Korea since the 
early 1960s, and it is analytical in that we analyze the reform process with the explicit framework of 
reform dynamics and the associated causal hypotheses presented in section 2.  
 
As the rest of the paper will show, Korea has been relatively successful in carrying out policy and 
institutional reform. Whether this success has served the country well by putting the economy on a 
path of sustainable growth is, however, yet to be seen, since new institutions, especially when they are 
alien institutions such as so-called global standards, do not necessarily work harmoniously with local-
specific institutions. That is, successful institutional reform—successful not simply in changing 
institutions but in achieving its ultimate objectives—is not simply a matter of transplanting 
institutions from another society: it must contribute to making the country achieve sustainable 
economic growth. 
 
The next section discusses a theoretical framework for the analysis and derives the four main 
hypotheses. Section three is about the reform in the pre-crisis era. The pre-crisis era also played a role 
in the initial conditions for the post-crisis reform, because the post-crisis reform starts when the pre-
crisis reform stopped. Section four describes the post-crisis reform measures and their outcomes. The 
reform will be discussed in terms of the overall, political, and macroeconomic aspects, as well as 
financial, corporate, and labor reforms. Section five provides analytical narratives of the post-crisis 
reform as well as verification of the hypotheses with case studies. The last section provides a 
summary of the main findings of the study and a reflection on the current state of the Korean 
economy after seven years of reform. 
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2. Theoretical Framework and the Hypotheses 
 
1) Analytical Narratives on Institutional Details 
 
Now, a new consensus in economic development has emerged, beyond the Washington consensus.  It 
is the recognition that institutions are quite dominant over other determinants of economic 
development (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Rodrik, et al. 2004). Institutions of a given 
society affect the path of its economic development by structuring political, economic, and social 
interactions among its members (Greif 1994; North 1981; Williamson 1985). As such, institutions can 
either promote economic development or retard it. As noted by North (1998), societies that are stuck 
in an “institutional matrix” that does not evolve into the impersonal exchange will fail to achieve 
economic growth, as they are unable to capture productivity gains that come from the specialization 
and division of labor. Thus one of the critical things that the developing countries must undertake to 
bring about economic development is to introduce “correct” institutions in the three areas of market 
regulating, market stabilizing, and market legitimizing (Rodrik, et al.  2004).  
 
But for a number of reasons, as demonstrated in the case of reforms in the transition economies in 
Central and Eastern Europe, such institutional reform is difficult to implement and that has to do with 
the incompatibility that may exist between initial conditions or local specificity on the one hand and 
the institutions being introduced into the country on the other (Lin and Nugent 1995, p.2362). Thus, 
mere transplantation of successful institutions from DCs to LDCs is unlikely to have the expected 
positive effects on performance.  
 
This observation serves as a warning on the complexity involved in institutional reform and the 
importance of considering the country’s initial conditions in undertaking institutional reform—no 
“one-size-fits-all” solution. The purpose of this proposed project is to examine Korea’s reform 
experience to shed light on this issue of compatibility between what is known sometimes as global 
standards and local specificity. 
 
In our attempt to examine the reform dynamics in Korea, we employ an “analytical narratives” 
approach that combines historical research with theoretical analysis (e.g., Bates et al. 1998, 2000). In 
its original form, the analytical narratives try to combine historical and comparative research with 
rational choice models, or, more flexibly, it can be understood as a combination of deep knowledge of 
the case and an (any) explicit theoretical model. An analytical narrative is constructed as follows. First, 
the analyst immerses him- or herself in the details of the particular subject or episode to construct a 
story out of these elements. The second stage is to formulate a rationalistic theory or model that fits 
this story. Then the model is crafted to fit the data. When the data does not support the model 
predictions, the model is not to be abandoned but to be reformulated. Then, this test and revision 
process iterates until a model that provides an acceptable fit with the detailed narrative has been 
constructed. 
 
To build a theoretical model to analyze the post-crisis reform in Korea, we looked at the details of the 
reforms, and found that the key elements in explaining the reform episode include the interest politics 
among diverse players and how the reform blueprint is formed and changed throughout the reform 
process. We have named the model as a model of reform dynamics. 
 
2) The Model of Reform Dynamics and 4 Hypotheses 
 
In our model, the reform is perceived like a two-stage game, firstly about the formation of the reform 
blueprint, and, secondly about implementation of the blueprint (see figure 2-1 below). Various players 
participate in the formation of the blueprint and its implementation. Thus, diverse ideas, theories, and 
interests compete with each other in this reform game. We posit that there exists an ideal blueprint, 
and that the actual blueprint tends to deviate from this ideal affected by the contests among theories 
and interest groups. The same is posited for the implementation process, such that actual 
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implementation tends to fall short of ideal implementation. 
 
An ideal reform blueprint is one that reflects objectively the existing reality of the economy (the 
initial conditions) and the existing economic theories or ideas. Some key components of the initial 
conditions (or local specificity) include: historical role and the perception of the state in the economy, 
long prevailing structure of ownership and governance in the firms, and the level and structure of trust 
between management and labor, and so on. Depending upon which economic theories are adopted, 
interpretation of the reality (data) is different and the prescription henceforth is different. For example, 
at the time of the crisis, the dominant economic view was that Korea now needed to follow the Anglo-
Saxon model of the economy as the old “Korean” or “East Asian” model failed, leading the economy 
to crisis. In other words, despite the miraculous achievement in the past decades, the old model was 
suddenly abandoned. The atmosphere at the time was such that no alternative voices dared to be 
raised. The (Korean) economists have not had a strong theoretical model to justify the past growth 
mechanism or systems in Korea as an alternative to the mainstream economic view which tends to be 
more friendly to the Anglo-Saxon economic system. 
 
However, as Jwa (2003) argues, an ideal blueprint should take into account local specificity in Korea. 
For example, the global standards in corporate governance pre-supposed the American style firm 
where ownership and management were separated and the main agency problem was between the 
shareholder and the management. But, in the typical Korean firms, the owners are also the 
management, and thus the source of the agency problem was different from that in the Anglo-Saxon 
firms.  
 
However, it is also true that the reform cannot mean preserving everything from the past. Reforms 
have been called upon because something went wrong, and wrong behavior or policies were linked 
with wrong ideas or theories.  
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Figure 2-1 
Model of Reform Dynamics: Interplay of Diverse Models and Interests 
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Figure 2-2:  Players and Strategies in Reform-Dynamics in Korea 
 
Players and their goals 
 
External:  IMF:    stability of financial order and international legitimacy 
         MNCs:   investment return and access to the local market 
 
Local:   Big Business: continuing control over the firm 
         Government:  economic growth and political popularity 
         Bureaucrats:  private benefits and promotion 
         Labor:        economic security and political power 
         NGOs.:        values (justice, equity; transparency etc) 
 
Strategies:  Each players proposes its own input/ideas for reform process  
                To maximize their objectives 
 
Stage 1:  Formation of the Blueprint for reform 
 
Stage 2:  Implementation of the Blueprint 
 
 
 
 
Thus, we can state the first hypothesis as follows 
 
Hypothesis One:  
 
Tension between the global standard vs. local specificity tend to become the cause for the mixed 
results and/or the sources for conflicts. 
 
This first hypothesis is our answer to one of the three questions raised in Fanelli (2003), namely why 
some reforms were more successful at delivering the expected outcomes than others.  In this regard, 
we would like to emphasize the correct handling of conflicting goals and ideas to reconcile the 
tension between the global and local standards.  The leadership should identify the correct reform 
goal first, and then study the initial conditions (local specificities) of the country to write a good 
blueprint suitable for the goal, keeping in mind that global standards are often suitable only for 
developed countries (eg. bias for profitability against growth). 
 
In our model, whatever the “ideal blueprint” may be, the actual blueprint is affected by various 
objectives of interest groups and their habits (behavioral patterns, eg, inertia, rigidity and so on). Here 
the IMF and MNCs are external interests, in addition to local interest groups, such as big business, 
bureaucrats, labor and so on. Each of these players has its own objectives and habits and tries to 
represent its interest toward the blueprint (see figure 2-2). For example, the chaebols wanted to keep 
their control over their corporate empire, whereas the bureaucrats wanted to preserve their influence 
over the economy and tend to rely on “uniform regulations” as reform measures (Jwa 2003). Workers 
wanted to be economically secure and protected by social safety nets, whereas civil activists or 
NGO’s pursued such values as justice, transparency and equity with less concern for economic 
competitiveness.  
 
Since the mid 1980s, there was emerging a new kind of political economy, driven by the wave of 
democratization. First of all, it became easier for vested interests to become organized and actively 
pursue their parochial interests at the expense of the developmental objectives of the state. Such 
interest groups, becoming more active after the mid-1980s, were labor unions, consumer 
organizations, taxpayers, intellectuals, and the media. They began to make their voices heard in policy 
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making, thus weakening the autonomy that the technocratic bureaucracy had enjoyed until then.  
 
The voices of those interest groups had a significant effect on the actual course of the reforms 
undertaken in Korea. The political elite and bureaucrats, who were used to the practices of command 
and discretion, now began to be increasingly co-opted by interest groups, and the vested interests of 
domestic producers, who benefited from those practices, fought their read-guard action against the 
forces of change, blocking or distorting the reform efforts in many sectors in the economy. The 
reforms actually implemented in Korea in the 1980s and 1990s were, consequently, an outcome of 
conflict and contradiction between these traditional and new forces. 
 
Of course, interest politics itself does not necessarily lead to the failure of economic reforms if the 
country has a political system that can effectively mediate the claims of competing interest groups for 
reasonable comprise solutions. When Korea was “democratized” in the mid-1980s it was far from 
having such a system in place. It lacked strong democratic institutions such as a firmly established 
system of legislative bargaining necessary for disputing parties to negotiate (Mo 2001). Even in the 
areas where formal democratic institutions existed they were not very effective as they were not 
compatible with the country’s traditional political culture. For example, in the National Assembly 
informal rules such as constraints on majority rule often took precedence over formal rules; people 
were lukewarm in supporting democracy in action although they expressed their support for it in 
principle; and they lacked the fundamental democratic values and attitudes such as pragmatism, trust 
and tolerance, and the belief in equality and rights (Mo 2001).  
 
With complicated interest politics, the actual blueprint would be farther form the ideal blueprint. The 
gap between the ideal and actual blueprint can be a source for low performance of the reforms. But, 
also important, is to have at least consensus about the reform itself. Reforms take place, as pointed out 
by Ruis and van de Walle (2003), in the context of political and cultural institutions and their outcome 
depends on whether the state is strong or weak and also is backed by strong or weak consensus. 
Without consensus or reform coalition, reform cannot start at all.  Thus in the figure 1 we have a box 
indicating the “polity” as institutional vehicle or space for resolution of idea/interest conflicts toward 
building of a consensus. It is often the case that with diverse interest groups arguing for their stakes, 
consensus is not reached. This was the case of the early to mid 1990s reform efforts in pre-crisis 
Korea, especially financial reform and labor reform. Such aborted reforms eventually resulted in crisis 
in 1997. Thus, we have the following the hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis Two:  
 
2-1. It is very critical to have reform consensus, without which reform is more likely to be aborted 
or unsuccessful.  
 
2-2 The aborted reform is likely to bring on a crisis and then the crisis can serve as the momentum 
to build reform consensus as well as bring back old agencies such as state bureaucracies. 
 
This second hypothesis is our answer to one of the three questions raised in Fanelli (2003), namely 
why some countries were able to undertake reform while others were not?  We observe that for the 
reform to be undertaken, conflicting interests should be negotiated and coordinated to form a reform 
coalition by strong leadership, external pressure, or dispute-settling institutions. 
 
After the agreement on the blueprint, implementation begins. However, the process of implementation 
itself is again subject to interest politics. We note that in the implementation stage, local interest 
groups tend to raise their voices more effectively and to succeed in representing their interests 
whereas these local interests or ideas were dominated by “global standards’ and external pressure or 
interests during the stage to form the blueprint. Furthermore, one of the difficulties in bringing in 
radical changes has to do with the durability of informal institutions which constrains the type and 
speed of changes in the areas of formal institutions because the newly introduced formal institutions 
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will have to be compatible with informal institutions if they are to be effective (Lin and Nugent 1995). 
For these reasons, we can expect that actual implementation of the actual blueprint is likely to deviate 
from the ideal implementation and their impacts will be limited or distorted. Thus we have the 
following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3: 
 
3-1. While reforms tend to be more successful in the area of quantifiable or tangible targets, less 
satisfactory reforms are often in the areas related to habit and intangible institutions.  
 
3-2. Even the quantifiable or more visible successes are often made in a disguised manner without 
real changes. This tendency could in turn result in unintended “undesirable” consequences, such 
as eroding future growth potential. 
 
The case of post-crisis reform in Korea is consistent with the above hypothesis. The initial state of the 
economy at the beginning of the reform was characterized by: an economy under heavy regulation by 
state bureaucrats; family-controlled business with opaque corporate governance; confrontational labor 
management; and state-owned or controlled banks. After the waves of the reform, the present state of 
the economy seems to be not much different from the initial conditions although some progress, of 
course, has been made.  One pattern we notice is that reform tends to have achieved some nominal 
success in terms of making new laws and several quantifiable targets (eg. debt-equity ratio; 
introduction of outside directors in the board), and to be more successful in the area where interests 
conflicts are less acute. In contrast, the reform tend to make little success or takes more time in really 
changing institutional conventions, habit and beliefs, such as enhancing transparency in the 
management or trust in labor relations.  
 
While the hypothesis three addresses the consequences of strategic responses from the agents who are 
affected by the reforms, there is some difficulty facing the reformers owing to the inter-connected 
nature of institutions comprising a national economy. Because the character of one reform critically 
depends on the character of the others, we need to find out ‘general equilibrium” blueprint and/or take 
a proper sequence in reforms. It is important for the state to recognize this.  That is because it is 
ultimately the state that executes the change although various actors or groups of actors compete to 
secure or increase their parochial interests. 
 
Since Aoki and Okuno (1996) coined the concept of institutional complementarity to explain the 
Japanese economic system, this concept has been utilized in various contexts, especially in the debate 
on shock therapy vs. gradualism in transition economies. In the case of reform in Korea, we have also 
found various examples of complementarity or clustering of institutions. For example, to successfully 
carry out a banking reform, which involves writing off bad loans, restructuring debt, and prudential 
regulation, is directly linked to business restructuring and labor market reform. But, to go ahead with 
business restructuring, it encounters the difficulty associated with the owner-controlled nature of the 
Korean firms and corporate governance. In labor market reform, low level of transparency in the 
management and governance tend to interfere with the reform effort to bring in more flexibility in 
labor market. The discuss above suggest the following logical (maybe not practical) sequence of 
reforms, namely moving from banking reform, corporate governance, labor relations, and then to 
finally business restructuring. Thus we have the following hypothesis. 
 
 11
Hypothesis 4:   
 
4-1. One source of the implementation difficulty in reform has to do with the institutional 
complementarity (Aoki and Okuno 1996) among the sectors.  
 
4-2. In consideration of inter-connectedness of institutions, the implementation should take a 
proper sequence in reforms, possibly moving from banking reform, corporate governance, labor 
relations, and then to finally business restructuring . 
 
This last hypothesis is our answer to one of the three questions raised by Fanelli (2003), namely what 
factors enabled some countries to successfully implement their reform program while the program 
failed in others. Our recognition is that it has first to do with the implementation strategy in taking 
into account institutional complementarities and in taking a proper sequencing being aware of the 
impact lags, so that the reform may be pursued enough long time.  
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3. Political Economy of Partial Reform in the Pre-Crisis Era 
 
1) Demise of the Initial Take-off Regime 
 
The political economic system that existed during the Park regime in the 1960s and 1970s was often 
characterized as a state-led economy or developmentalism. Although it was basically a market 
economy, it differed from the standard textbook version of a free market economy in that the state 
held a commanding post in resource allocation through its control over credit allocation. As remarked 
by a number of observers (e.g. Cho 1994), that system of political economy resembled the one that 
Japan used in the post-World War II period to catch up with the West. This resemblance was, however, 
no pure coincidence as President Park was trained at a Japanese military academy during Japan’s 
colonial occupation of Korea and allegedly had little regard for academic economists and as he relied 
on economic experts who had been educated in Japanese schools or had worked in Japanese banks. 
He looked at Japan as a model for rapid economic development (Woo 1991).  
 
Envisioning Korea’s transformation within his lifetime into a “second Japan,” Park Chung Hee took 
on a few chaebols as his lifetime partners in grand business deals. To induce their entry into what he 
perceived as strategic industries, Park assembled a lucrative incentive system. In fact, he built a 
system where winning a state license for the entry into a strategic sector de facto functioned as a 
certified check for growth — if not business success. Park had state banks supply massive subsidized 
loans, while security agencies assured industrial peace through labor repression. The finance ministry, 
too, made an input, siding with chaebol owners against minority shareholders over corporate 
governance structures. These institutions of bureaucratically governed finance, imperial corporate 
governance structure centered on a single owner family, and company unionism, in effect, enabled 
chaebols to follow Park Chung Hee into risky business ventures without fearing a threat of financial 
insolvency, a revolt of minority shareholders, or prolonged labor unrest during his rule. 
 
Moreover, once big business invested on a production scale Park Chung Hee wanted, it too inevitably 
acquired an interest in getting high growth going. Entrapped in large debts, small sales volume, and 
huge surplus capacity, any prolonged recession threatened a business collapse. Thus, whenever a 
global recession set in, its owner managers lined up behind Park Chung Hee, whose political instinct 
was to opt for an unorthodox strategy of “adjustment” through reflation. The state injected more 
money into Korea’s overheated economy, hoping to buy time until a turnaround in global markets 
rescued chaebols from a financial crunch. The state-owned banks, too, endorsed its strategy of 
“growing out” of financial squeeze because they were sacked with massive nonperforming loans, 
which it thought could be controlled only if high growth continued. The original decision to grow 
through subsidizing chaebol conglomeration with bank loans, then, had built into Korea’s economy an 
incentive structure strongly biased toward expansion. The state, big business and banks all became a 
captive of each other, backing each other’s effort to keep Korea economically afloat by inflationary 
financing. 
 
President Park was even able to fend off challenges from external sources to his own strategy of 
economic development. Despite objections from the World Bank on the ground that Korea did not 
have a comparative advantage, he launched the industrialization of heavy and chemical industries in 
the mid-1970s. As long as his strategy was successful in bringing about rapid economic growth there 
were few challenges to the regime to change its policies and institutions. 
 
In the late 1970s, however, Korea ran into a number of economic problems—a terms-of-trade 
deterioration resulting from the second oil crisis and a high rate of inflation and excess capacity and 
low profitability in some of the heavy and chemical industries, a consequence of the heavy and 
chemical industrialization policy launched in the second half of the 1970s. In the midst of the crisis 
President Park was assassinated in October 1979. The sudden demise of Park Chung Hee’s take-off 
regime in 1979 suddenly awakened society to the dangers of his way of modernization.  
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2) Early Reforms following the Washington Consensus 
 
Taking advantage of the state of social instability, the former military general, General Chun Doo 
Hwan, took the power by a coup led by in 1980. The new government that followed the coup lacked 
political legitimacy and took the course of restoring the country’s economic health as a way of 
securing the legitimacy and survival of the regime. Continuing with the state-led development 
strategy of the previous regime was not, however, a viable option for the new regime since the public 
held it responsible for the crisis. In need of new ideas and new policies to bring back the economic 
health the government brought in a number of economists who had been trained in neoclassical 
economics at major American universities (Moon 1994).  
 
One such individual, brought in as the chief economic advisor to President Chun Doo Hwan, was a 
Stanford University trained economist named Kim Jae Ik. He and his like-minded colleagues prepared 
a major reform agenda—mostly macroeconomic—for the new government. The agenda consisted of a 
reduction in government deficit, a tight monetary policy, a restraint on the growth of wages, trade-
account liberalization, relaxing control over foreign investment, privatization of major commercial 
banks, and phasing out the subsidies to heavy and chemical industries (Kim 1991). These are exactly 
the set of policies that subsequently became to be known as the Washington consensus—fiscal 
discipline, appropriate public expenditure priorities, tax reform, financial liberalization, appropriate 
exchange rate policy, trade liberalization, abolishment of barriers to foreign direct investment, 
privatization, deregulation, and property rights (Williamson 1994).  
 
The support of the president of an authoritarian government empowered the liberal economists who 
met few challenges to translating policy prescriptions of neoclassical economics into a concrete 
reform agenda to be adopted by the new government (Woo 1991). 
 
The economic reform since the early 1980s after the death of the President Park was largely in the 
area of macroeconomic policies, and the policy reforms helped Korea resume rapid economic growth 
throughout the 1980s. Macroeconomic stability was achieved with manageable budget deficits and 
external debt, low or moderate inflation, and a stable exchange rate (World Bank 1993). Thus, in 
terms of macroeconomic policy and performance Korea was a success case of the countries following 
the Washington consensus. But, the reform had not changed the other blocks of the economy, such as 
the power of chaebols and their opaque corporate governance and the continuing state involvement in 
the banking sector.   
 
3) Stories of the Partial Reforms 
 
There are two sectors in the Korean economy where substantial but still partial reforms were 
undertaken through the 1980s and 1990s, which laid the foundation for the crisis of 1997. These are 
the reforms in the financial sector and industrial relations.  
 
Financial and Corporate Reform 
 
The fact that the policymakers in Korea accepted the principle of financial liberalization does not 
mean that they were successful in carrying out the reform. Powerful interest groups influenced the 
way that financial reform was carried out, which is the phenomenon called ‘economic entrenchment’ 
(Morck, etc 2004). 
 
In the early 1990s, the government deregulated the entry and business scope of financial institutions 
in order to promote competition in financial markets. As a result, a number of merchant banks were 
created but many of them were formerly investment finance companies owned by chaebols families. 
Another important deregulation in domestic financial markets was a significant loosening of 
restrictions on chaebol ownership of other nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) such as life 
insurance companies and investment trust companies. 
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In the 1980s the government was not successful in deregulating interest rates because the chaebols 
were opposed to it in fear of a heavier interest burden that higher market-determined interest rates 
would impose on them (Choi 1993). In the 1990s, however, much progress was made in interest-rate 
deregulation because the chaebols saw an advantage in having free NBFIs and thus freer access to 
credit. Thus, in 1993 restrictions were lifted on all lending interest rates (except for policy loans). The 
actual implementation of this deregulation policy took, however, a bizarre course. 
 
As originally planned, long-term interest rates were to be deregulated before short-term interest rates. 
In the event, however, short-term interest rates such as the rates on the certificates of deposits and 
commercial papers of NBFIs were deregulated first in a speedy manner while the time deposit rates of 
commercial banks were still under de facto government control. Likewise, all restrictions were 
removed from interest rates on NBFIs’ commercial papers and the amount that they could issue while 
restrictions remained on the interest rates on commercial bank loans and corporate bonds.   
 
A consequence of this “short term commodities first, long term commodities later” deregulation was a 
rapid increase of the share of commercial papers in firms’ external financing from 7.6 percent in 1992 
to 16.1 percent in 1995 (Cho 1999).  High-yield commercial papers and other short-term instruments 
became an important segment of the financial market with NBFIs becoming a major player. The 
market also became a dualistic structure consisting of tightly controlled commercial banks lending at 
low controlled interest rates and rapidly growing and relatively free NBFIs headed by merchant banks, 
many of which were owned by the chaebols, lending at higher market-determined interest rates. 
 
The measures taken to open the capital account included removing regulations on the issuance of 
foreign-currency denominated bonds and on export-related foreign borrowing and general 
commercial borrowing, and abolishing the annual ceiling on foreign-currency loans by financial 
institutions. These measures did not, however, apply equally to both long-term and short-term 
transactions: short-term transactions were fully deregulated while long-term transactions were either 
partially deregulated or not at all.  
 
What accounts for the unbalanced financial opening in Korea? Although the Korean government was 
fully committed to the principle of financial liberalization it nonetheless regarded it necessary to use 
the commercial banks as a vehicle for achieving policy objectives such as promoting small and 
medium-sized enterprises and establishing strategic industries. The pressure for financial 
liberalization was increasing, however, from both the chaebols that saw the advantage of having easy 
access to the global capital market through their NBFIs and foreign financial interests that saw 
profitable opportunities in investing in the then booming Korean economy. Under such unyielding 
pressures the government undertook financial reform, giving in where the pressure was strong and 
holding back where it was not (Cho 2003). Given that NBFIs’ activities were mainly in short-term 
transactions whereas those of the commercial banks were in longer-term maturities, the unbalanced 
financial opening was an inevitable outcome of the interest politics playing on financial reform. 
 
While financial liberalization—both external and internal—gave more freedom to the chaebols in 
their search for financing, the government’s ability to control them and curb their highly concentrated 
economic power was significantly reduced since 1993. The ceiling on the ownership of bank shares 
was also raised in 1994, allowing more shares to be purchased by the chaebols, and in 1996 they were 
given more freedom with respect to the ownership of NBFIs. Although the government also made 
effort to introduce stricter rules regarding cross debt guarantees, cross shareholdings, insider trading, 
the role of the board of directors, and the rights of minority shareholders it failed to translate its effort 
into laws.  
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Labor Reform 
 
A significant change in industrial relations took place in the mid-1980s with political liberalization in 
Korea, which radically changed government policy toward labor movements. Until then the primary 
role of the government was that of maintaining industrial peace by taking repressive measures against 
labor movements. Even when and where unions were allowed they were not effective in representing 
the interests of workers as their continued existence depended on the favor of the government. 
 
The mid-1980s marked the watershed in the short history of Korea’s industrial relations when with 
political liberalization the government shifted its policy from labor-market repression to 
liberalization—a lifting of state repression on labor movements. Since then workers have gained 
greater freedom in organizing, collective bargaining, and industrial action. The immediate effect of 
labor market liberalization was nothing but disruptive. Between July 1987 and June 1989 the number 
of unionized establishments increased from 2,725 to 7,380 while the union membership rose from 
1.05 million to 1.83 million. During the second half of 1987 there were 3,600 strikes with about 70 
percent of manufacturing establishments with more than 1,000 workers involved in strike in 1987 (F. 
Park 1991). 
 
When the government changed its labor policy the country was ill prepared institutionally for 
workable industrial relations. None of the three parties involved in industrial relations—unions, 
management, and the government—had had any experience in bargaining and negotiation, and 
whatever laws there existed were inadequate in bringing about reasonable compromises in labor-
management disputes. For instance, the existing laws did not specify what was to be bargained over 
between labor and management and how labor agreements were to be ratified. As a result, there were 
strikes over issues that are typically not negotiable in most industrialized countries and there was also 
a higher rate of ratification failures. The lack of bargaining experience and knowledge of bargaining 
principles compounded the labor dispute problem (D. Kim and J. Lee 2001).   
 
There were also qualitative changes in industrial relations—the strengthening of the core-workers 
unions in chaebol companies in heavy and chemical industries, the growth of white-collar worker 
unions, increasing solidarity among regional and industrial unions, and the unionization of public 
sector workers. These changes had the effect of increasing labor market rigidity when Korean firms, 
especially the chaebols, were becoming increasingly subject to competitive pressures from the 
globalization of the Korean economy. 
 
The first major labor market reform in Korea began in 1996 with the official aim of upgrading labor 
laws to the international standards, a condition that was required for Korea’s entry into the OECD. 
Business leaders, however, saw the top priority of reform as that of increasing labor market flexibility 
while trade unions saw it as an opportunity to expand labor rights such as a right to free association 
and organization, collective bargaining, and political representation of their interests. The state was 
thus confronted with two conflicting forces—democratization of industrial relations by expanding 
labor rights on the one hand and the demands by business for increasing labor market flexibility on 
the other. In the end the Korean National Assembly passed a law favoring the interests of business, 
which was soon followed by a general strike, the first in Korean history. The government was forced 
to repeal the law, revising it to make it more pro-labor, but it satisfied neither business nor labor. A 
more profound change in labor laws had to wait until the outbreak of the economic crisis in late 1997. 
 
1996 OECD Entry and the Crisis in 1997 
 
Partly because of his desire to leave a lasting imprint in modern Korean history, Kim Young-sam 
endorsed in 1993 the plan to enter the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and set December 1996 as the entry date. Without serious labor, financial and chaebol reform 
pursued, Korea entered the borderless global capital markets with a real sector surviving on bank 
subsidies, plagued by labor market rigidities, and entrapped in an opaque corporate governance 
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structure. Finally, exactly one year after the entry, Korea fell into a financial crisis in late 1997. 
   
4) Summary of the Pre-Crisis Reform  
 
The economic reform since the early 1980s after the death of the President Park was largely in the 
area of macroeconomic policies. They were largely successful, putting Korea as a success case of 
following the Washington consensus. However, the reforms had left intact basic economic structure 
that relies heavily on the chaebols. There are at least three reasons for that. The first is that following 
the Washington consensus, the guiding principle of the reform in Korea, focused largely, if not 
entirely, on establishing “correct” macroeconomic policies and removing government intervention 
from the market. The second reason is that by the time the reform began in the early 1980s the 
chaebols had become a powerful political force that was able to influence the formulation and 
implementation of specific reform agenda (Lee, Lee and Lee 2002). The third reason is that although 
changing macroeconomic policies is a politically challenging task, it is not as difficult as disbanding 
or downsizing the chaebols and changing corporate governance and labor-management relations. The 
latter requires changing formal institutions as well as informal institutions such as sanctions, customs, 
and traditions. 
 
One of the difficulties in changing institutions is that the durability of informal institutions constrains 
the type and speed of change that may be made in formal institutions (Lin and Nugent 1995). How 
informal institutions limit the effectiveness of the reforms is demonstrated in the cases of chaebol 
reform and privatization. chaebol reforms were difficult because they became increasingly 
independent of government for their financial needs. This, combined with their size and importance in 
the economy, gave them political power to influence the course of reform in the subsequent decades. 
Regarding the privatization of banks in the 1980s, what actually took place is different from changes 
in law and official policy as it did not remove government intervention from their management. In 
spite of privatization the government continued to appoint bank directors and officials, maintaining an 
“overly cozy” relationship with the banks (Emery 2001).  
 
In conclusion, the pre-crisis reformers did not aim at systemic transformation. Korea continued its 
overexpansion up to the last days of its high growth era, which ironically made its political elite even 
more obsessed with the rhetoric of reform. However, political actors could not agree on what was the 
root cause of the recurring problems and how it could be remedied. They all called for reform, but 
without a common definition of the problem at hand. Even among state ministries, who possessed 
power and expertise to deal with the problem, opinions constantly evolved through time. The policy 
elite continuously developed new policy instruments, only to find them inadequate in taming their 
economy’s propensity for overexpansion. The result was a state continuously adding policy 
instruments onto their partial reform package and expanding its organization to bringing society under 
its tighter regulatory control. 
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4. The Post-Crisis Reforms and the Outcomes: A Description  
 
1) Initiation of the Comprehensive Reforms 
 
When the crisis brought down Korea to its knees in December 1997, its ability to deal with the 
challenges of reform looked rather limited. The candidate of the opposition party, Kim Dae-jung, 
triumphed over the incumbent party’s Lee Hoi-chang by mere 1.5 percent of the total votes. Equally 
critical, Kim Dae-jung headed a minority political party.  
 
The surprising outcome, however, was comprehensive reform. The fragile bases of power hardly 
obstructed him from consolidating presidential authority. The victorious Kim Dae-jung became a de 
facto president on December 19 and had his own “Hundred Days of Reform” plan even before being 
sworn into office on February 25, 1998. With his blessing a newly established Economic Emergency 
Council rescheduled private foreign loans on January 29, a Transition Committee drew “a hundred 
reform agenda” by February 12, and a Government Reorganization Commission reestablished a 
system of check and balance within economic bureaucracy by dissolving Korea’s hitherto 
superministry FEB on February 16. Two days earlier, a Tripartite Commission consisting of labor, 
capital and state representatives had agreed to amend labor laws to recognize the employers’ right to 
layoff workers. The potentially uncertain days of power transition had become a period of 
fundamental structural reform, as he dexterously used the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
conditionalities as a political tool to change the behavior of both societal and state actors. 
 
The political mechanism to transform Korea’s financial crisis into a catalyst for comprehensive 
reform on all three fronts of financial, corporate and labor reform was the Tripartite Commission. 
Established on January 1998 as a presidential advisory commission, it produced a “social contract” by 
February 6. The interdependence of key issues required a “package deal,” extracting concessions on 
job security from the labor federations in return for a reform on corporate governance structure by the 
chaebol, a strengthening of labor unions’ political rights, and a provision of welfare programs for 
discharged workers. The whole episode looked surreal, with Kim Dae-jung — a politician known for 
nationalist and populist political inclinations — single-mindedly pursuing a “neoliberal” program of 
massive downsizing through a political mechanism consciously modeled after social democracy of 
Western Europe in Korea’s fragmented society of Confucian familism.  
 
The strategy worked, however. The Tripartite Commission’s grand compromise of February 6 settled 
over 90 issues in 10 major policy areas. Thereafter, the employers could layoff workers and bring in 
outside workers on a temporary basis, while labor unions could engage in political activities including 
election campaigning and political fund raising. The hitherto illegal Teachers’ Union would also be 
recognized after an interim period of a year and a half, while the chaebol agreed to gradually cut back 
on cross shareholding, to reduce cross loan guarantees, and to institute a new corporate governance 
structure with the major shareholders held accountable for their business decisions. 
 
2) The Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership and the Reform Coalition 
 
The comprehensive reform was made possible partly by Kim Dae-jung’s uniquely situated political 
position. Unlike his predecessors, Kim Dae-jung faced a more simple political task of “letting” the 
crisis persuade society of the need to reform. No major societal force publicly blamed Kim Dae-jung 
for financial troubles. The public anger focused solely on the preceding president, Kim Young-sam, 
and the political establishment. Kim Dae-jung escaped criticism even when he made a U-turn to 
disassociate himself from his own populist election pledges to “renegotiate” the IMF conditionalities 
after the election. Moreover, having an advocate for a dialogue with North Korea as well as the 
deepening of political liberty and civil rights, Kim Dae-jung’s public life had been intimately tied 
with more liberal wings within Washington.  
 
The same Kim Dae-jung, moreover, had carefully projected himself as a champion of the masses, 
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allying with more radical segments within Korea’s dissident group before 1992 to restructure society. 
Deeply sympathetic of American ideals of liberty, but also personifying the progressive version of 
Korean nationalism and populism, Kim Dae-jung of 1998 was the right man for the right job at the 
right time — a transformation of Korean nationalism into a constructive pragmatic force for crisis 
management and economic recovery. He saw American pressures for reform as legitimate advice of a 
concerned ally and asked labor to sacrifice in the interest of all Koreans. Kim Dae-jung was better 
posed than other political leaders to push through IMF conditionalities without precipitating 
nationalist and progressive political backlashes. No one questioned Kim Dae Jung’s legitimacy. The 
IMF shock treatment was instead perceived by most Koreans as a package of reform measures needed 
for their over-regulated and over-expanded economy. 
 
The conservative sectors of society who bore a deep mistrust of Kim Dae-jung for his previous 
progressive political rhetoric could not but rally behind those words of reform because they were a 
political pledge to put Korea firmly on a socially conservative track of economic adjustment. The 
labor side was in a different situation. With Kim Dae-jung endorsing neoliberal reform, the Korean 
labor unions in effect became a social force without a powerful spokesman within political arenas. 
The desertion of labor by Kim Dae-jung accordingly did not make him an enemy of the workers. He 
still remained ideologically closer to labor than any other political leader, which preempted labor 
unions from frontally challenging Kim Dae-jung’s reform efforts.  
 
Furthermore, as a political outcast excluded from power before the 1997 victory, Kim Dae-jung was 
free to break with Korea’s prevailing model of economic growth. He did not owe much political debts. 
Nor was his reputation invested in the exiting policies. This fact decisively separated him from 
Indonesia’s leaders in 1997, for whom the financial crisis was a moment of personal political crisis. 
The newly elect president was neither a ‘Suharto’ in Indonesia personally responsible for dragging 
society into an abyss of despair by pursuing an unsustainable path of economic growth based on a 
selective distribution of privileges and favors among family members and confidants, nor a ‘Habibie’ 
chosen for succession by a fallen dictator himself to ensure personal political safety.  
 
Kim Dae-jung was free from all this. The profound sense of national crisis brought by the crisis also 
forced society to rally behind him under the banner of economic renewal. The harsh neoliberal reform 
program of shock treatment and economic downsizing became even a laudable act of statesmanship.. 
The Korea Gallop reported a public approval rating of 70.7% for Kim Dae-jung’s performance in 
office in April 1998 — an increase of 17.3 points from January — despite the layoff of half a million 
workers since January. The amazing popularity of Kim Dae-Jung as reform leader might have been 
partly helped by some degree of information asymmetry on the part of the ordinary people about the 
true and eventual costs of the reforms, given that it is the first time that Korean society faced such 
situation of economic crisis and IMF-conditionality reform. Randall Calvert (1985) proposed a 
theoretical model supporting this reasoning about the linkage between information asymmetry and 
political behavior. In particular, the labor side might have had an illusion that their sacrifice will be 
compensated later since Kim Dae-Jung has been a long-time spokes person of their interests.  
 
3) Reform Measures and the Outcome in the Post-Crisis Korea 
 
Macroeconomic Adjustments  
 
Reform Measures  
 
One of the important conditionalities by the IMF was tight monetary and fiscal policy and 
raising interest rates, a standard prescription. The high interest policy was justified to stabilize the 
exchange rate by inducing foreign capital and to kill heavily-indebted or inefficient firms. Some 
policy makers argued that it was too harsh for the economy. As the exchange rate became stabilized 
by the end of the second quarter of 1998, the IMF and the Korean government agreed to lower interest 
rates and to increase government spending. 
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After this turnover in the policy directions, the main momentum for recovery was the expansionary 
fiscal policy with massive injection of public funds. From 1998 to 2002, the government expenditure 
had grown at an average annual rate of 24.8 percent, while it had grown at an average annual rate of 
19.6 percent during 1993-1997. The ratio of government expenditure to GDP has increased from 18.3 
percent in 1993 to 22.9 percent on 2002 (see table 4-1).  Such pump-priming by the government led 
to the revival of the domestic consumption, with growth at 9.4% in 1999. 
 
To cure the trade deficits from the pre-crisis period and boost exports, the Korean currency Won were 
allowed to depreciate, as much as 47 percent from 1997 to 1998. The nominal effective exchange rate 
of won per dollar has depreciated by 34 percent during the same period. Such adjustment in1998 has 
helped Korean firms to recover its competitiveness. 
 
Outcomes  
 
After one and half year after the crisis, the Korean economy made a remarkable recovery in 1999, 
growing at the rate of almost 10% after a minus 6 % in the crisis year of 1998 (see table 4-1). It went 
through, however, a gradual slow-down since then. However, the V-shaped recovery in Korean 
economy had been faster and broader than those observed in most of crisis-inflicted economies. Hong, 
Lee and Rhee (2002) has also shown that Korea’s contraction and recovery were sharper than most of 
other post-crisis recoveries. Changes in the stock prices also reflected the course of economic change. 
The stock index was as low as 200 or so at the peak of the crisis, and it soared up to 1,000 in 1999 
until it decreased again to the pre-crisis level of 600 in 2000. Since 2002, the stock prices gradually 
recovered, sometimes hitting 800 or 700 or so in 2003.  
 
The high interest policy at the initial stage of the reform contributed to stabilizing the exchange rate, 
but, at the same time, have aggravated the sharp cutback in domestic demand as emphasized in Pyo 
(2004). For the same reason, the sudden imposition of the BIS standard (minimum 8 percent rule of 
maintaining banks’ own capital) was not a realistic goal for the economy which had maintained 33 – 
37.5 percent domestic savings rate, 34- 40 percent ratio of gross domestic investment and high debt-
to-equity ratio (524 percent for the big-30 conglomerates, 467 percent for the big-5 and 350 percent 
for Non-chaebol companies as of end of 1997) (Pyo 2004). 
 
Also important is the fact that the post-crisis recovery is led by consumption expenditure helped by 
injection of public funds and lower interest rate policy rather than strong come back of private 
investment. As table 4-1 shows, consumption expenditure has grown steadily (9.4%, 6.7%, 3.7%, and 
6.2% during 1999-2002), while gross fixed investment has not (3.7%, 11,4%, –1.8%, and 4.8% ). 
 
The sharp reduction in real investment during the crisis period of 1997 and 1998 by -2.2 percent and -
21.2 percent respectively has not been fully recovered during the post-crisis recovery period (1999-
2002) with the annual average growth rate of 4.4 percent. This is a fairly sizable reduction in real 
investment when we compare it with the average annual growth rate of 9.1 percent during the pre-
crisis period of 1993-1996 (Pyo 2004). Barro (2002) also points out that the permanence of this 
recovery is uncertain and that the failure of investment ratios to rebound significantly in the crisis 
countries suggests that the crisis had a long-term adverse effect. 
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Financial Reforms 
 
Reform Measures 
 
In financial reforms, the strategy of the Korean government was to reform the financial system first so 
that the banks and other financial organizations may be in a good position to deal with their corporate 
clients, namely giving them pressure for change. The government revised the Bank of Korea Act to 
promote the central bank independence with price stability as its main mandate. It also established the 
Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) as an independent consolidated supervisory authority for 
banks, security houses and insurance companies and two state-owned corporations, the Korea Asset 
Management Corporation (KAMCO) and the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC), to clean 
up the non-performing loans and strengthen the capital base of the banks. 
 
Restructuring of financial system took off in June 1998 as the financial supervisory authorities 
ordered the five commercial banks, out of a total of 20 or so in Korea, to be closed. The other 7 banks 
are to continue their operation conditionally and were given some time for improvement of capital 
structure. Thus, out of these 7, the big two, Citizens Commercial Bank and Hanil Bank, were merged 
each other to become Hanvit Bank, and the other three were merged too. Relatively good performing 
banks were also subject to merger drives. The Foreign Exchange banks succeeded in improving its 
capital structure by introducing foreign capital from Germany, and the Kukmin bank also sold the 
largest bloc of stocks to the Goldman and Sacks Co. The Cheil Bank, one of the top banks, has very 
recently become to be controlled by New Bridge Capital. 
 
Most importantly, most banks have now become subject to better internal monitoring of management 
as they adopted a board system with a majority of non-executive director; now most commercial 
banks in Korea appoint 7 to 9 non-executive directors and 2 to 3 executive directors. 
 
Outcomes 
 
As of end of October 2002, the financial restructuring status reported by the Korean Public Fund 
Oversight Committee (KPFOC) indicates there has been significant restructuring in both banking and 
non-banking sector. The net consequences of restructuring in the banking sector can be discussed as 
follows. According to the Korean Financial Supervisory Service, the total number of the employees 
has been reduced by 40 percent as of 2002 and that of branches by 20 percent as of 2000. The ratio of 
non-performing loans (NPL) in total loans has been reduced from the peak of 8.3 percent in 1999 to 
1.9 percent in 2002. Both return on asset (ROA) including trust accounts and returns on equity (ROE) 
have improved from –0.9 percent and –14.2 percent respectively in 1997 to 0.6 percent and 11.7 
percent respectively in 2002. The BIS ratio has also improved from 7.0 in 1997 to 10.5 in 2002. 
 
Corporate Governance Reforms 
 
Reform Measures 
 
Corporate governance system can be discussed in terms of fairness, transparency, and accountability 
(OECD 1998).  
 
Transparency: First, the business groups or chaebols are required to produce the so-called combined 
financial statements (CFS), beginning in fiscal year of 1999, which would help disclosure the details 
of complicated intra-group transactions. In addition, Korea’s “Generally Accepted Accounting 
Practices” (GAAP) was revised to be more in line with international accounting standards. Also, the 
top thirty chaebols and all listed companies were required in February 1998 to introduce the 
independent audit committees with representations by minority shareholders and creditors. 
  
Fairness: First of all, formerly forfeited voting rights of institutional investors were now fully 
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recognized in September 1998. Also, the threshold for filing stockholder derivative suits was also 
lowered from 1 percent to 0.01 percent of total shares. In addition, to make the controlling 
shareholders accountable for their management results, the related laws were revised in December 
1998 to regard a controlling shareholder as a de factor director. This should be an important 
improvement since in the old system, although the controlling shareholders are actively involved in 
the management and makes all the important decisions, they don't take any responsibility for their 
actions since they do not hold either the official title of the CEO or the directors in the board. Maybe 
most importantly, all listed companies are required by law to appoint at least one outside director. 
  
Increasing recognition of rights of non-controlling shareholders has also to do with the rise of foreign 
shareholders. Foreign investment related laws were revised in May and October 1998, which now 
allowed all forms of mergers and acquisitions. Now, in many listed companies of Korea, the foreign 
shares are reported to be higher than 51 %, such as in Samsung Electronics, Samsung Fire Insurance, 
Bank of Housing, and Medisson. Also, a survey by the Korea Stock Exchange (reported in 3/16/99 
Maeil Business News) indicates that the listed companies with higher foreign shares tend to perform 
better in terms of profits and debt reductions. The former group also showed a profit increase of 132.5 
percent in 1998, whereas the latter group experienced the three time increase of their loss in 1998. 
 
Stability (Capital and Business Structure): To give pressure on the heavily indebted companies to 
improve their capital structure, the top 64 largest companies were forced to sign financial pacts, with 
their respective creditor banks, stating the commitment to reducing their debt to equity ratios to below 
200 percent. New cross guarantees were already prohibited from April 1998 on, and all the existing 
cross guarantees are now practically eliminated.  
 
Flexibility (Exit and M&A): Given the group-based structure of many Korean chaebols, the overall 
capital structure of the chaebols can be improved substantially when they are able to sell out or close 
non-viable member firms or business divisions. Actually, there were relatively high "exit barriers" in 
the Korean economy associated with rigid, lengthy, and inconsistent regulations and laws regarding 
the exit of the firms. Thus, several bankruptcy- related laws were amended in February 1998. The 
amendment simplified legal processes for corporate rehabilitation and bankruptcy filing, and gave 
more roles or voice for the creditor banks in the resolution process. Following the December 7th 
agreement of business swap, the top five chaebols signed financial pacts with their respective creditor 
banks of dramatically reducing the number of their subsidiaries from 272 at the end of 1998 to 136 by 
the end of 2000. Also, in May 1998, the creditor banks established a formal review committee to 
assess the viability of 313 client firms showing signs of financial weakness. Upon completion of their 
evaluation, creditor banks declared 55 firms as non-viable, of which 20 are affiliated with the top five 
chaebols, and 31 with the top 64.  
 
Outcomes 
 
One of the most notable achievements of the reform has been in the area of capital and business 
structure. Above all, the debt equity ratio of big businesses were reduced from more than 400% to less 
than 200% percent as dictated by the government.  As you can see table 4-2 (part A), by the end of 
2002, the simple average debt equity ratio of the top 5 chaebols are now only 177 %, and for the 6th 
to 30th chaebols, it was 262%. The top five chaebols have already eliminated substantially cross-debt 
guarantees within each group.  Profitability has improved significantly in terms of both the absolute 
amount of profits and the profit rates. In terms of the average of top 30 chaebols, net profit to sales 
ratio has improved from –0.8 % in 1997 to 3.48 % in 2002, and the amount of profits, from –3.2 
trillion Won to 1.01 trillion Won during the same period. This pattern implies that the big business in 
Korea has been reorienting their focus from sales or market share expansion to profitability or the rate 
of returns. 
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Labor Reforms 
 
Reform Measures 
 
Tripartite Committee: For the first time in Korean history, the government, business, and two labor 
organizations established the Tripartite Commission (TC). The Federation of Korean Trade Unions 
(FKTU) and the more radical Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) joined the TC. Among 
the agenda agreed by the TC, one of the most important is promotion of labor market flexibility. The 
union accepted employers’ right of redundancy lay-off and dispatch of workers. In return, unions were 
entitled to more political representation, unemployment insurance, and extended social safety net.  
 
Labor market flexibility: New law specified the procedures for the redundancy layoffs, so a firm is 
required to “exhaust all means to avoid it” before making a layoff. Means include wage reduction, 
work sharing, not filling vacancy arising from quits or retirements, no new hires, and contract buyout 
with a bonus, and firms were bound to consult “sincerely” with union leaders on lay-off. If an 
employer makes layoffs without taking this procedure, he can be subject to fine or sentenced to 
imprisonment. It is very controversial whether all means were exhausted, or how sincere were the 
consultation. 
 
Social Safety Net: The government extended subsidies for job-sharing, rehiring laid-off workers, and 
new business, so-called venture business. Subsidies for retraining and arrangement for job search was 
another component of the policy. Unemployment benefits were further expanded to cover more 
workers in firms. Also the minimum benefit level is increased to 70 percent of the minimum wage 
(from 50 percent). And the minimum duration of benefits are extended to 2 months, while the eligible 
minimum period of contribution was reduced from one year to six months. Unemployment policy 
targeting female and youth was also invented. The government extended subsidies to wages for 
unemployed female house heads recently hired in a new firm. 
 
Outcomes 
 
Failure of the Tripartite Committee: The effect of the accord is mixed. TC has contributed to maintain 
social peace at the early stage of the reform, but it failed to stabilize industrial relations. TC did not 
have a legal binding power even to the Ministry of Labor. The only function it did was issuing 
recommendations. Without the support from the government officials, the committee became a 
symbolic entity. As time has gone, the discontent of the labor began to grow. KCTU made repeated 
withdrawal from the committee demanding bilateral negotiation with the government. After all, 
FKTU also withdrew from the committee in December 1999 denouncing government’s stance 
regarding the ban of paying full-time service personnel of the union.  
 
Changes in the labor markets: Main burden of the enhanced flexibility was borne by “labor” via the 
“labor-market flexibility” mechanism prevalent in the Anglo-American countries. It is not strange that 
joblessness rose, particularly among unskilled workers (see table 4-3). Unemployment and 
underemployment rose in terms of both quantity and duration. There appeared a significant proportion 
of “atypical,” part-time and daily workers in the “employed” pool. 
 
Massive reallocation was made: many new jobs were created while even more jobs were destroyed. 
As a result, many of those who formerly had stable, high-wage jobs became either employed in 
unstable, low-wage jobs, or unemployed. The increase in non-regular jobs does not appear to reflect 
firms’ attempt to reorganize work to achieve long-term efficiency gains, but instead, it seems to reflect 
their temporary attempts to cut labor costs in the short run (Kim, 2002: 262). Most disadvantaged in 
labor market were unskilled workers. In large firms, here the flexibility was most needed; the increase 
of non-regular workers was least noticeable, while the proportion of non-regular workers increased 
very fast in small and medium size firms. It shows that the burden of introducing flexibility at the 
macro-level was unequally imposed in the labor market. As a result, the dual structure of the labor 
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market was strengthened and it was segmented into the core and the periphery.  
 
After the crisis, unions of the large firms, led by KCTU used the opportunity to demand massive wage 
increase, and the wage gap between large and small firms continued to grow. Unions of large firms 
increased their job security at the cost of new job employment of youth and the wage of periphery 
workers. It is noteworthy that the scapegoat is the youth group. Unemployment rate of the youth 
skyrocketed at the beginning of the crisis, and still remains very high. Increasing inequality is 
reflected in Gini coefficient which rose from .283 to .320 between 1997 and 1999. 
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5. Analysis of Reform Dynamics: Analytical Narratives and Hypotheses 
 
In this section, we provide an analytical narrative of the post-crisis reform in Korea and by doing so 
we will verify the four hypotheses derived in section 2. Verifications are done by elaborating the 
examples consistent with the hypotheses. 
 
1) Tension between the Global vs. Local Standards 
 
Hypothesis One: Tension between the global standard vs. local specificity tend to become the cause 
for the mixed results and/or the sources for conflicts. 
 
Example 1-1: The Tension in the corporate governance reform 
 
Anglo-Saxon model vs. Chaebols 
 
What would have been the ideal blueprint for corporate governance and restructuring in post-crisis 
Korea? The Korean corporate model, despite its great achievement in the past, has no solid theoretical 
model, and thus it failed to defend itself successfully against the sudden invasion of the global or 
Anglo-Saxon model. The only defense of the Korean model was its success itself but the financial 
crisis and the collapse of the many firms nullified this position in a day. Therefore, in the post-crisis 
reform era, the dominant blueprint was the Anglo-Saxon model.  
 
The core of the Anglo-Saxon model is known to be the central position of the shareholder value in 
corporate governance. Along this line, we can find the definition of efficient corporate governance. 
Shleifer and Vishny (2000) state that the efficiency of corporate governance system should be 
considered in view of the possibility that investors can get back the returns from their investment. 
They also pointed out two concrete conditions to construct efficient corporate governance system in 
firms. The first is the existence of large shareholders since holders of negligible shares would not 
have much interest in monitoring firm behavior and management, as they are subject to the free-rider 
problem. Here, there may be two types of large shareholders. The one is the permanent large 
shareholder, like the main banks in Japan or German or owner-family in the Korean firms. The other 
is the contingent large shareholder, which appear as a take-over bidder or LBO associations in M&A 
only when the firms perform bad. This is the case of Anglo-Saxon firms. The large debt-holder is also 
eligible since they too have a big stake in the firms they lend their money. 
 
The second condition for efficient corporate governance is the protection of minority shareholders’ 
rights against possible expropriation by the controlling shareholders. So, there have appeared diverse 
devices for this purpose, such as derivative suits, rights of access to accounting books, and so on. 
 
We can see that the underlying idea for the conditions for efficiency of corporate governance system 
is that there should be an owner-controller who has a vital stake in the firms and takes responsibility 
for the outcomes, and at the same, while such person is given authority and initiative to run the firms, 
he should not be allowed to sacrifice the interests of non-controlling minority shareholders.  
 
While these are general conditions for efficient corporate governance, we can address another issue 
which is especially important in the Korean context. That is the reduction of the private benefits from 
being the controlling-owner. This is important since the reason for the controlling-owner to want to 
set up the controlling minority structure is to enjoy the private benefits from such control. The bigger 
the private benefit from controlling the firm, the more likely the controlling-owner is to take the 
otherwise-unjustifiable projects. In a similar context, Bebchuk (1999) observes that the founder of the 
firm would like to maintain the control over the firm, rather than take the firm to the public, when 
there is available bigger private benefit. The same logic applies to the case of the CMS (controlling 
minority structure) firm; the controller would like to maintain the CMS structure as long as it 
continues to give him/her private benefits. So, if the CMS or separation of control rights and cash 
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flow rights is the source of the problem for the chaebols, then we have to first reduce the private 
benefits from controlling the firm. Then, the owner-controller would have less incentive to maintain 
the CMS setup of the firm by circular stock ownership and/or stock pyramids. In the Korean context, 
higher protection of non-controlling shareholders’ rights, and more disclosure of accounting and 
financial information of the firm would be effective. 
 
Now, given the dominance of the Anglo-Saxon model and the definition of efficient corporate 
governance, let us examine to what extent the reform followed this model and blueprint. First, we can 
see that we should not try to get rid of the owner-controller from the Korean firms. It is so good to 
have such family that has a stake in the firms. Rather it is necessary to induce them to increase their 
share in the firms. Second, there is a definite urgency to increase and protect the rights of non-
controlling shareholders and investors. Third, it is important to reduce the private benefits of the 
controlling shareholders. Fourth, if we are also concerned with competitiveness of the firms, the firms 
are to be given full freedom in their investment decision-making. Then, the revival of the regulation 
on the inter-firm equity investment by firms belonging to big business groups should be avoided. Any 
shortcomings or illegal matter had better be handled now by shareholder activism than by the clumsy 
visible hands of the government. 
 
Now let us compare this ideal blueprint with the actual blueprint. Then, we first notice that despite 
that the active role of the board is not one of the critical components in the ideal blueprint, post-crisis 
corporate reform put heavy emphasis on the reform of the board system and introduction of outsider 
directors. But, as noted before, the boards is the key institutions in the Anglo-Saxon models of the 
firms and it is important because the board is expected to provide the check and balance against the 
management so as to alleviate the agency problem is between the shareholders and the top 
management. However, it is also well–known that the board’s role in this check and balance is limited 
because they are usually friends of the top management. 
 
In light of the ideal blue print, a more critical area should be the strengthening of the rights of non-
controlling shareholders. Shareholders’ rights have of course increased in terms of the threshold for 
exercising rights to file suit, making proposals at a general meeting, inspection of firms’ accounts, and 
the dismissal of directors. But, class action suit against directors, which is one of the most effective 
tools to enhance the rights of shareholders, are not introduced and delayed for later period, like 2002. 
And as of 2003, the Korean society was still debating whether and how to introduce this scheme. It 
seems somewhat strange why the scheme was put off for later periods. Maybe the Anglo-Saxon 
package did not realize the important of this measure or maybe strategy of big business was to allow 
the not-so-critical components such as the outside directors and to try to delay this critical measure of 
class actions. Anyway, few agree that now in Korea the non-controlling shareholders have effective 
means to protect their rights in the firm, and for this reasons, we can say that the second important 
conditions for the efficient corporate governance has not yet been fulfilled in Korea. In this sense, it 
was a kind of “partial implementation” (Ruis and de Walle 2003). As noted, in partial implementation, 
the least onerous components or the one that has the least impact on the status quo tend to be 
implemented (ibid.). 
 
Reversal of the Global Standards: the Revival of the Regulation on Inter-firm Equity Investment 
 
If non-controlling shareholders are given effective means (class actions) to protect their rights 
(invested capital and returns), then the government would not have to worry much about the firm 
management and not have to impose so many regulations over the firm behavior. In this regard, one 
interesting example is the regulation against chaebol firms’ equity investment over other firms. The 
Korean government and the Fair Trade Commission have set a maximum limit on the inter-firm 
equity investment as the 25 to 40 % of net asset of each affiliated company. It is well known that with 
this circulating equity holdings among affiliates, the chaebol families were able to keep their control 
over the empire, and it seems natural for the regulation body to try to limit such investment. However, 
it is against the global standards since it regulate investment behavior of the private firms; in the US 
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there was no such restrictions. Furthermore, with the opening of the stock market and heavy inflow of 
the foreign portfolio investment in the stock market, the foreign share increased rapidly.  The Korean 
firms then complained about the possibility of hostile takeover by the foreigner whereas they cannot 
defend themselves given the regulation against the inter-firm investment. Such restriction against 
investment was also perceived as hindrance to restructuring, entry into new business and exit from old 
business. Thus, this regulation was abolished in February 1998. 
 
However, from April 2001, just 3 year after the abolishment, the restriction was re-instated. That 
argument was that without this restriction, chaebols had been trying to just issue more stocks to meet 
the debt-equity ratio reductions rather than paying off the debts. As table 4-2 shows, the debt-equity 
ratios actually declined substantially without paying off debts. This was possible as the top chaebols 
issued simply more stocks taking advantage of the re-bounding stock markets. However, this revival 
of the investment restriction signifies the reversal of the global standards or the reform, by the 
bureaucrats. While many foreign firms have now entered the Korean markets competing against the 
Korean firms and while any former barriers to M&A are now all abolished, it is unfair and against the 
market principle that the Korean firms are discriminated in terms of investment. Owing to this 
restriction, firms are using up substantial resources to defend against possible M&A threat as 
exemplified by a famous case of the SK group against the Sovereign investment group which bought 
and held a largest block of shares in 2003 and 2004.  
 
One of the reasons for the revival of this regulation of inter-firm investment, despite that it is not a 
component of the global standards, might has to with the interests of the political leadership to satisfy 
the activist NGO groups and the general attitudes in the Korean public against the big power of the 
big business, as well as possible wishes of the bureaucrats who want to maintain their influence. In a 
sense, it might be called another example, or Korean version, of the clientalism although in this case 
the clients were not big business but NGO’s and popolarism (Ruis and De Walle 2003). 
 
Rigid Imposition of the Global Standards: The 200% Debt-Equity Ratio 
 
Another important reform measure was the reduction of debt-equity ratio. In Anglo-Saxon model and 
in most developed countries, debt-equity ratios are lower than 200% while it used to be around 400% 
in Korea. With development of capital market, progress in related reforms, and the experience of 
financial crisis itself, it is natural to expect a gradual and eventual decline of this ratio in the Korean 
firms. But the Korean government declared the uniform and abrupt goal of the 200 % as the ultimate 
targets. While the Korean firms actually fulfilled this target, it is out of question that such uniform 
regulation is neither efficient nor beneficial to competitiveness (Jwa 2003). An acceptable or optimal 
debt ratio varies among the firms, industries and countries.  
 
The issue of uniform reduction of debt ratio is the problem of both blueprint and implementation 
according our model. Preference for such extraordinary practice of uniform regulation sits at the 
bottom of the habit set of the Korean government and bureaucrats. As a legacy of the state-led 
industrialization, the paternalistic government, refusing to discriminate among different firms, has 
often found it “politically safe” to apply the same disciplinary measures across the board to all firms 
(Jwa 2003). 
 
Example 1-2: Tension in the Labor Market Reform 
 
Whereas post-crisis reform aimed to restore market forces in the bureaucratically structured labor 
market, the interactions among major actors and groups has produced such a segmented labor market 
that core sector workers are over-protected while periphery workers are under-protected. The gap 
between aspiration and achievement cannot be explained without considering the local specificity 
such as institutional and cultural context for reform. Whereas the central intent of the reform agenda 
was to alter Korea’s institutions, the reform effort was itself embedded in that same institutional 
matrix. It was inevitably compromised as a result.  
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One of the key reasons for the confusion and conflict during the post-crisis labor reform is closely 
related with the conflict between two different types of economic system. In return for the bailout 
program, IMF has imposed the liberal market economies model that was a ready-made prescription 
for the economic illness in Latin America or in Eastern Europe. Without enough time to reflect on the 
validity of the model, Kim Dae Jung hastily accepted the prescription of the IMF.  
 
Reviewing the history of capitalism, we find varieties of capitalism based on different institutions and 
reflecting diverse natural environment, culture and historical backgrounds (Hall, 1986). 
Notwithstanding the differences in the details, Korean version of capitalism has been rather closer to 
the Japanese than the Anglo-American or European version of capitalism, as is marked by the close 
relationship between the government and the business, enterprise-based welfare system, and firm 
based internal labor markets.  
 
After the economic crisis, however, the reform is equated with imposing the global standard that is 
another name of Anglo-American model, on local context. However, we find at least three different 
types of institutions are mixed as a result of reform. First of all, industrial restructuring and change in 
corporate governance was based on the Anglo-American model, while the tripartite commission was 
based on the European model of “private interest governments,” where the state delegates her power 
to the peak organizations in labor and business sector, and these peak organizations, with the 
representation and holding power over the affiliated members, coordinate and bear the responsibility 
of the macro-economic policy. Two different blueprints were in conflict with each other, and with the 
local employment system. 
 
Anglo-American Model of Labor Market Flexibility and its Problem 
 
Coupled with the long tradition of paternalism and cherish for long-term relationship between 
employer and employees, Korean employment regime (K-type hereafter) is quite different from the 
Anglo-American employment regime. This Korean model resembles the Japanese employment 
system in several points, especially its emphasis on harmony among workers and the role of 
leadership and teamwork. Wages are determined by seniority of workers, and had very rigid structure 
with wage sum well protected from the fluctuation of economic cycles. Therefore the speed of 
promotion becomes the main incentive, as it ultimately determines the amount of life-long 
remunerations. In the Korean model, as in Japanese case, the most important skill is firm-specific 
skills and knowledge. 
 
It is obvious that Korean type employment has quite opposite characteristics from the Anglo-
American system, or “the global standard” in employment system. Labor market reform, therefore, is 
a shock in several aspects. First, layoffs give more impact to K-type workers than to the A-type 
workers. Layoffs deprive of the contextual knowledge from workers, as it is embedded as sunk cost in 
tightly coupled employment relationship in K-type system. As K-type is a ‘task-oriented system,’ laid-
off workers have more difficulty to find a comparable job in different firms. Secondly, the dynamism 
of the K-type employment has been maintained by the rapid growth of the economy, and implicit 
agreement that workplace is a ground for life-long commitment comparable to family. But economic 
crisis and stagnation has destroyed the myth of family-like life-long engagement. Economic 
stagnation undermined the stability of promotion system, thus making higher positions increasingly 
redundant. Thirdly, many companies have identified layoffs as panacea to their problems. For the first 
time in Korea’s recent economic history, these core workers, usually highly educated managers and 
skilled technicians, became the target of mass layoffs. However, mass layoffs of core members 
undermined the moral foundation of the K-type system, such as harmony and commitment. Gradually, 
the implementation of layoffs confronted the resistance of the labor, especially from the well-
organized sector.  
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Implanting European Corporatist Model to the Korean soil  
 
Tripartite Pact among the government, the labor, and the business was a valuable gift for the Korean 
delegates in New York who were negotiating for rollover from the international financial community. 
The pact was regarded as the elimination of major barrier to the economic reform, i.e., removing labor 
market rigidities. But the tripartite committee was a hurriedly constructed without institutional legacy. 
There are several reasons for the failure of the TC in Korea.  
 
First of all, there is no tradition of party-politics based on class-cleavages in Korea. TC was rather an 
arbitrary arrangement without the support of political party that represents the interest of the working 
class. Both KCTU and FKTU did not hold the real power to or properly represent affiliated unions. 
Enterprise-based unionism, which has been the tradition in Korean trade unionism, was not 
functionally compatible to the TC that was developed in corporatist institutional framework. As peak 
labor organizations have neither the capacity for policy-making nor the power to impose the decision 
to affiliated unions, social pact became a mere scrap of paper. Secondly, Korean companies have 
developed enterprise-based employment system, represented by the firm internal labor market. Also 
labor unions tried to develop isomorphic structure to respond effectively to the enterprise-based 
employment system. Companies tried to develop “employee consciousness” and trade unions 
responded with “union member consciousness,” but both of them were based on the same enterprise.  
 
While there is neither tradition of macro-level institutionalization nor compromise between labor and 
capital at the enterprise level, the hastily signed Tripartite Pact includes all macro-level policy issues 
such as legislation of layoffs and labor dispatch, corporate reform, social insurance reform, social 
integration, and government restructuring. Without power and dedication to monitor the agreement 
and to sanction the violator, the maintenance of the Pact was very vulnerable to abrogation by any 
part. 
 
2) Reform Consensus and Aborted Reforms 
 
Hypothesis Two:  
 
2-1. It is very critical to have strong reform coalition and/or consensus, without which reform is more 
likely to be aborted or unsuccessful.  
 
2-2. The aborted reform is likely to bring in the crisis and then the crisis can serve as the momentum 
to build reform consensus as well as bringing back old agencies such as state bureaucracies 
 
Example 2-1: The aborted financial reform in the 1990s that could have avoided the crisis.  
 
With democratization since the late 1980s, the diverse vested interests groups became organized to 
pursue parochial interests at the expense of overall goal of growth. These groups included labor 
unions, NGOs, intellectuals, and new media. In contrast, the autonomy of technocratic bureaucrats 
has gradually been weakened. While there was also reform effort immediately before the 1997 crisis, 
it got astray in midst of conflicts and contradiction between traditional and new forces. A specific 
example is the abortion of the 1993-94 financial reform. The lessons is that we need to have first a 
system of effective legislative bargaining necessary for disputing parties to negotiate. Only with this, 
interest politics does not necessarily lead to reform failure. In what follows, let us provide the details 
of the effort for financial reform in the early 1990s. 
 
President Kim Young-sam established a Presidential Commission on Financial Reform (PCFR) in 
January 1997, precisely when the fiasco over labor reform profoundly discredited his government. 
The initial talks of orchestrating a “big bang” in financial sectors quickly disappeared. The president 
had lost all moral authority with his labor fiasco as well as the scandal over corruption involving a 
now-insolvent Hanbo Group. Moreover, the PCFR itself was a moderating force on reform, with 
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thirteen of its thirty members drawn from big business who — as the primary beneficiary of 
bureaucratically distributed bank loans — had an interest in avoiding any “radical” solution. This was 
most unfortunate since any realistic solution on nonperforming loans could not be but radical, given 
their astronomical size hitting the level of 14.3 percent of all outstanding loans. Only through a 
radical program of corporate workout, massive layoffs, bank privatization, and foreign takeover could 
Korea put the banks and NBFIs on a financially viable footing. The PCFR predictably — and for 
understandable political reasons — focused on administrative reorganization instead, producing a 
proposal which would give the central bank an effective control over monetary policy, while 
concentrating all regulatory powers over banks and NBFIs in a newly proposed Finance Supervisory 
Commission (FSC). 
 
However, even this proposal for organizational reshuffle did not survive bureaucratic struggles. The 
hitherto excluded Finance and Economic Board (FEB, established in 1994 by the merger of EPB and 
MOF) rebelled, successfully revising the reorganization bill to win back most of its power over 
monetary policy. The FEB retained its power to prepare financial laws, including the authority to 
distribute licenses and permits to set up NCB and NBFI branches. The Financial Monetary Committee 
— formally the highest authority in monetary policy — was also placed above rather than inside the 
central bank (in direct opposition to the PCFR’s proposal), with its chairperson subject to “removal by 
the President upon the recommendation of FEB Deputy Prime Minister.” These revised reorganization 
bills then sat idle in the floors of the National Assembly because the legislators would not put them to 
the vote. Even the leaders of the ruling NKP publicly advocated an indefinite postponement of 
financial reform as early as May 1997, even before the bills were prepared by the PCFR and revised 
by the FEB.  With only six months left for the presidential election, it was difficult even to convene a 
national assembly session to deliberate on the reorganization bills. Entrapped in a devastating war of 
negative campaign after July 1997 and hit by massive business failures since January, both ruling and 
opposition political parties chose to evade making a choice on financial reform (B. Kim 2000). The 
president meanwhile had become a lame duck, discredited by the charges of corruption as well as 
incompetence since the political fiasco over labor reform in January. Even his own political party 
turned against him, arguing for a national assembly hearing on economic mismanagement and 
irregularities. The party even forced Kim Young-sam to “withdraw” the party membership in 
November. The reform accordingly drifted without a political supporter until Korea pleaded for an 
IMF bailout. 
 
To sum up, the forces of democratization and globalization undermined the two mechanisms to force 
adjustment when the Korean economy over-expanded. Democratization made it difficult for the state 
to transfer much of adjustment costs to the workers through political repression, whereas 
globalization opened a way for the chaebols to escape from the state’s regulatory control and to 
finance their business ventures by directly borrowing from abroad. 
 
Example 2-2: Case for the state brought back, or the reason for the continuing supremacy of the state 
in the Korean economy 
 
The financial crisis was a joint work of the reckless chaebol expanding into uncompetitive business 
fields, the ideologically contentious but organizationally fragmented labor movements defending job 
security and company welfarism, the illiquid financial sector opposing workout, and the increasingly 
clumsy bureaucratic leviathan that not only opposed reform for its fear of losing discretionary power, 
but also fostered financial troubles by mismanaging macroeconomic policy and pursuing partial 
reform since 1988. However, one of those culprits — elite career bureaucrats — saw their power 
increase with Korea’s liquidity crisis and became entrusted with the task of restructuring the very 
economic system they had created since 1961. 
 
The survival of elite bureaucrats has to do with the unique background of the new Korean president, 
Kim Dai-jung, who used to be a long time political outsider. Right upon taking the new post, he 
recognized early on his lack of a broad brain pool and decided to make the old guard — elite career 
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bureaucrats — his people by entrusting them with key posts. The former EPB and MOF bureaucrats 
monopolized all key economic policymaking posts, including the presidential staffs and cabinet 
portfolios as members of the New Mainstream. The party politicians ruled, while career bureaucrats 
governed, as they had been doing all along since Park Chung Hee instituted the developmental state in 
1961. Neither the transfer of power nor the explosion of financial crisis fundamentally altered Korea’s 
way of making economic policymaking. The opposite was true, as political outsider Kim Dae-jung 
could only turn to the “neutral” state bureaucrats for a guide on economic policy if he were to respond 
effectively to the challenge of financial crisis. Kim Dae-jung knew of what the state bureaucracy 
could do for his reform, and unambiguously sided with the proposal to strengthen its role.  
 
The state bureaucracy, on the other hand, realized that Kim Dae-jung’s “neoliberal” reform is not 
contradictory to its interests as the reform itself needed the help of bureaucrats for implementation. 
On the contrary, the economic authorities — reorganized in early 1998 into a “policymaking” FSC, a 
“regulatory” Financial Supervisory Service, a “strategic” PBC, and a “coordinating” Ministry of 
Finance and Economy (MOFE) — in fact saw its power drastically enlarged with comprehensive 
reform, because more stringent prudential regulations and supervisions over financial institutions 
prevented planning bureaucrats and party politicians from intervening on behalf of industrial policy to 
demand subsidized policy loans for their constituents. Even the recapitalization of banks with public 
money strengthened the FSC and MOFE by driving out the chaebol from financial institutions. The 
state filled in as a shareholder, acquiring by May 1999 over 90 percent of shares in Korea’s top four 
commercial banks, and between 20.1 and 46.2 percent in seven others banks. 
 
Whereas the crisis threatened the chaebol with financial collapse and demoralized labor unions with 
the specter of massive layoffs, it empowered the FSC with the power to restructure banks and 
corporations, as well as transformed the FTC into a credible fair trade regulator. The Korean state 
bureaucracy certainly lost autonomy vis-à-vis international capital when it accepted the IMF bailout 
in 1997, but this loss became a source of power in its dealing with domestic economic actors.  
 
Herein lay an ironic twist in post-1997 Korean politics. Enjoying powers delegated by the President 
and filling in the institutional vacuum left by the bickering political parties, former state planners and 
finance bureaucrats found themselves leading comprehensive reform. The power of elite economic 
bureaucrats hardly suffered a blow. Thus, we can say that Kim Dae-jung was doing new things in very 
old ways. The reform initiative remained within the hands of elite career bureaucrats, as it had been in 
the past decades.  
 
 
3) Visible Success and Invisible Failure 
 
Hypothesis 3:  
 
3-1. While reforms tend to make more success in the area of quantifiable or tangible targets, less 
satisfactory are often the areas related to the habit and intangible institutions.  
 
3-2. Even the quantifiable or more visible successes are often made in a disguised manner without 
real changes.  This tendency could in turn result in unintended “undesirable” consequences, such as 
eroding growth potentials. 
 
Example 3-1: The 1980s reform 
 
The economic reform that took place in the early 1980s was largely in the area of macroeconomic 
policies, and the policy reforms helped Korea resume rapid economic growth throughout the 1980s. 
Macroeconomic stability was achieved with manageable budget deficits and external debt, low or 
moderate inflation, and a stable exchange rate (World Bank 1993). Thus, in terms of macroeconomic 
policy and performance, Korea was a success case following the Washington consensus. But, this 
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success came at a cost as it dulled the urgency for solving structural or microeconomic problems, such 
as the continuing arbitrary involvement of the government in the banking sectors, power of chaebols 
and their opaque corporate governance.   
 
Privatization of banks was one of the main reform measures, and many banks were actually privatized, 
selling the formerly government owned stocks. However, the privatization of banks did not remove 
government intervention from their management. In spite of privatization the government continued 
to appoint bank directors and officials, maintaining an “overly cozy” relationship with the banks 
(Emery 2001). This relationship between government and banks could continue to prevail partly 
because the Korean people used to believe in the idea of virtuous government as prescribed by 
Confucianism and expect the government staffed by educated mandarins to take an active role in 
promoting economic development (Cho 1994). It was such an attitude toward government that 
provided legitimacy to the extra-legal influence that the government exercised over the banks that had 
been legally privatized. This indicates how informal institutions limit the effectiveness of newly 
introduced formal institutions or reform measures.  
 
Also it was not easy to disband or downsize the chaebols and to improve their corporate governance 
and labor-management relations. According to Cho (1994), in Korea the owner-head of a firm holds 
an authoritarian position comparable to that of the head of a typical Korean household. In such a firm 
the owner-head is expected to behave (and thinks he is behaving) like the head of a household; that is, 
with tolerance and generosity which are valued as supreme virtues of the head of a large family (You 
1998, quoted in Emery 2001, p.59). As long as such persons remain the heads of enterprises and 
regard their employees as members of a large family it is hardly likely that any formal institutional 
reform designed to introduce the Anglo-American model of corporate governance in Korea would 
succeed in achieving its purported objectives. It would take changes in culture and social norms for 
that to bring about an effective change in corporate governance in the fashion of the Anglo-American 
model of corporate governance. 
 
This is what we mean by the local-specific initial conditions that any attempt to reform a country’s 
formal institutions must take into account, as they are slow to change and may not be compatible with 
newly introduced formal institutions. One of the difficulties in changing institutions is that the 
durability of informal institutions constrains the type and speed of change that may be made in formal 
institutions because the new institutions will have to be compatible with informal institutions if they 
are to be effective (Lin and Nugent 1995). 
 
Example 3-2: Post-crisis Corporate Governance Reforms 
 
As discussed in the preceding section, corporate restructuring has significantly improved the capital 
and business structure, namely reducing the debt-equity ratios and increasing profitability. This should 
be taken as a very important progress. In the past the typical strategy by chaebols in response to any 
government reform initiative tended to be a “time earning” strategy delaying implementation of any 
specific measures as much as possible. However, it is important to realize that the reduction of debt-
equity ratio was not made by paying off the debt but by issuing more stocks. In part B of the table 4-3, 
the average amount of the gross debt in the top 5 chaebols has rather increased from less than 50 
trillion Won to more than 50 trillion Won, and the other smaller business groups showed the same 
trend in this regard. In other words, the quantifiable or more visible successes are often made in a 
disguised manner without real changes. 
 
Next, when we look at the areas where habits and mindsets of the firms are involved, the outcomes 
are even less satisfactory or mixed. In the table 4-4, let us first look at the survey results of the 
corporate governance in 10 Asian countries done by the CLSA in 2001 and 2002. According to the 
table 4-4 part A, the scores by Korea have increased from 47.1 in 2001 to 62.0 in 2002 with its 
ranking improved from the 8th to 5th. In part B of the table 4-4, such improvements are decomposed 
into several sub-areas.  
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It shows that transparency has improved its ranking in biggest degree, possibly reflecting the 
introduction of the requirement to file the consolidated/combined statement. Also, progress has been 
made in such areas as accountability and responsibility, reflecting the increased rights of shareholders. 
Although class actions are still not allowed in Korea as of 2003, we can say that rights of general 
shareholders are now better recognized than before. We are now seeing and hearing many cases, 
which we have never heard before, where minority shareholders raise objections to, or raise sues to, 
the doings of the top management or controlling shareholders. Actually, increasing rights of minority 
shareholders has become a part of social movement, involving an organization called "Solidarity for 
Participation." In the meantime, the management is now starting to say that independent management 
is increasingly threatened by such movement as activists promoting shareholders' rights. Such voice 
from the management is understandable too, given the lack of sufficient "business judgment" safe 
harbors as in the American system (OECD 1998). Now, an increasing number of Korean companies 
are now buying their directors insurance for their legal liabilities in preparation for increasing law 
suits. In sum, the important matter should be how to balance the interests of the management and the 
shareholders, and, furthermore, how to align these two interests. OECD (1998) suggest that 
performance-based compensation is a useful tool for this purpose, with stock options as one of the 
best. However, in Korea stock options are just being introduced although it is being spread very 
rapidly. 
 
Turning back to the survey results in the table 4-4, one noteworthy feature is that all sub-areas have 
made progress except the independence of the boards. We take this feature very telling. All other 
aspects such as transparency, accountability and responsibility are measured in the survey by specific 
quantifiable or tangible targets. For example, the survey asked whether the shareholders can demand 
the general meeting of the shareholders and whether they have the rights to see the accounting books, 
and whether the group-affiliated firms report the consolidated and/or combined financial statements 
and so on. As you see, these are basically minimal formal requirements and cannot directly translate 
into transparency, accountability, and responsibility and so on. But, assessment of the independence of 
the board requires subject or qualitative perception, and in this area the survey shows deterioration. 
Appointment of the outside members in the boards has been one of the core reform measures and the 
role of the boards may have more direct links to corporate governance than other aspects. 
 
Table 4-5 compares Korea’s international ranking in terms of national competitiveness and corporate 
governance. In the results by the both the IMD and the WEF (World Economic Forum), we see there 
is substantial gap; Korea was ranked as the 27th in national competitiveness but its ranking in 
corporate governance is well below this. Also, in this comparison, the ranking in corporate boards 
(independence) is lowest. At present, in most cases, these independent directors are known not to play 
any active role in corporate governance, with a few exceptions. 
 
Last, we would like to point out that some of those visible successes come with the sacrifice in other 
important aspects. Owing to restructuring, corporate profitability has improved significantly. This 
pattern indicates that the big business in Korea has been reorienting their focus from sales or market 
share expansion to profitability or the rate of returns. These achievements might have come by 
sacrificing investment in physical capital and R&D. As noted in the preceding section, investment to 
GDP ratio has fallen substantially. As shown in table 4-1, investment to GDP ratio plummeted to 27 
percent or so during the 1999-2002 periods from 37 percent or so during the 1993-96 periods. While it 
is natural to see some decline from the excessive investment before the crisis, 10 percentage point 
decline can still be regarded as substantial. 
 
More specifically, we can ask what has happened in terms of real competitiveness and efficiency of 
the firms. This is important because more transparent corporate governance itself might not be the 
ultimate goal of the firms unless it is translated into performance.  
 
The empirical analysis using the firm data by Park (2003) show a little improvement in efficiency or 
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productivity although it might be too early to make a firm judgment about the impact of the reforms 
(see table 4-6). First of all, the rate of the total factor productivity change has rather decreased steadily 
from 2.4 % between 1996 to 1997 (pre-crisis period) to less than that in post-crisis period, for 
example only 1.2% between 1999 to 2000 in the case of the top 30 chaebols. When we decompose 
into this productivity change into three sub-components of technological change, scale efficiency 
change and technical efficiency (the distance from the production frontier), we note that the rate of 
technological change (rate of innovation) and the technical efficiency change has rather declined over 
the pre- and post-crisis period. For example, the rate of technological change was 1.7% over the 
1996/97 period, whereas it was only 0.8% during the 1999/2000 period. 
 
 
4) Institutional Complementarity and Sequencing  
 
Hypothesis 4:   
 
4-1. One source of the implementation difficulty in reform has to do with the institutional 
complementarity among the sectors.  
 
4-2. Implementation of reforms should take a proper sequence, possibly moving from banking reform, 
corporate governance, labor relations, and then to finally business restructuring . 
 
Example 4-1: Connectedness between Business Restructuring and Capital Market Efficiency and 
Corporate Governance. 
 
Before the crisis in 1997, the Korean economy was a symbol of high growth. Thus, the Korean firms 
had not experienced much restructuring of their business, namely the process of selling out, closing 
down, or reducing the unprofitable segment or subsidiaries. For this reason, the 1997 crisis was a big 
shock for the business. Post-crisis business restructuring was initiated by the government. The so-
called ‘big deal’ program was to implement business swap among the chaebols, or big conglomerates. 
Although the amount involved was so big,  the government had to play as intermediary. However, 
the government-initiated big deal had achieved only mixed results. For example, the sale of LG’s 
semi-conductor line to Hyundai did not lead to success and the troubled Hynix (formerly Hyundai 
Semiconductor) had emerged as one of the biggest headache for the Korean economy, and a part of it 
was eventually sold to a Chinese company. 
 
As there were many criticisms for the government-initiated business restructuring, the government 
tried to take a different approach for the second rounds of business restructuring starting in early 2001. 
The government only designated the names of those sectors and decided not to direct any concrete or 
detailed ways to restructuring. These sectors include chemical fiber, paper production, cement, 
agricultural machines and so on. While the situation of these sectors was particularly bad, there was 
not much market-driven restructuring in the form of M&A, divestment, or closing-down. Thus, the 
government wanted to something but there was really not much things to do, when they do not want 
to be blamed again for “inefficient government intervention.”  
 
However, the ‘voluntary restructuring’ was not easy, either. While the government wanted the firms to 
commit themselves to major hauling of their business, the firms were saying the without debt-equity 
swap or debt rescheduling or reductions, horizontal restructuring among the firms, such as M&A, 
would not happen. Commercial banks then said that without some words, even implicit signals, from 
the government, they cannot afford to give such favors as debt reductions or swaps and so on, and that 
it was better for the government to pour its own money to those troubled firms. 
 
Below, we will see what went wrong in this second round of business restructuring with the paper 
production industry as a representative case (Y. Kim 2002). Paper industry is a mature industry, and 
there was world wide restructuring, and its main form was M&A. While Western firms reframed from 
 34
expanding production capacity, the Korean firms had continued to expand the capacity throughout the 
1990s with their capacity more than doubled from the 1990 level. As the market turned into an excess 
capacity, the firms made losses and their debt ratio increased.  
 
Korean firms had tried to deal with this situation in their own ways, with strategic alliances as the 
main responses. For example, two companies signed an agreement of ‘comprehensive strategic 
alliance’ in February 2001. This agreement was to coordinate their production, marketing, 
procurement, and logistic. Their motivations were known to overcome the limits of within-firm 
restructuring by affecting the market with some coordinated actions among the players. 
 
But, any merger deal was not realized, and the reason for this is noted as deficiency in market 
infrastructure, including the lack of intermediary bodies, corporate governance issues and the related 
transparency problem in the firm. First of all, since information revealed in the accounting books of 
the firms are neither accurate nor reliable, it cannot serve as the basis for price negotiation in the 
M&A deal. While this is the first and immediate source for the price haggle, another source is the high 
premium for the management control rights. Since the corporate governance is not clear, there exist 
diverse channels for expropriation of company resources by the controller, the so-called “tunneling.” 
Since the stakes are very high for the controlling management, they wanted to maintain their control 
over the firms unless they are paid substantial premium. For these reasons, the two sides tend to find 
it difficult to agree upon the prices of the target. 
 
While this case shows the limit of the so-called ‘voluntary restructuring’ without direct government 
involvement, it also exemplify the market failure in the sense of the lack of intermediary vehicle to 
facilitate M&A and sale of the firms, associated with the efficiency and size of overall capital market 
in Korea. Another reason has to do with the prevalence of group-style firms in Korea. Since many 
firms are a affiliated firm of one business group or another, the restructuring is driven by the group-
level considerations, rather than at the level of each firms, which makes the process end up “intra-
group” restructuring. 
 
But, the point of the above story is not to blame the market-based or global standard approach itself, 
but rather to emphasize the need to address certain necessary conditions for such approach to be 
effective, or equivalently the importance of local specificity. We first noted the insufficient 
development of intermediary vehicle to facilitate M&A and sale of the firms, and then pointed out the 
extra premium attached to the owner-controllers’ of the firms associated with the opaque nature of 
corporate governance. The existence of controller’s premium suggest that this part should be tackled 
first before we take the “market will do the job (M&A)” attitudes.   
 
Example 4-2: Connectedness between Labor Reform and Corporate Governance. 
 
As Lee and Lee (1992) stressed, labor market in Korea during the high growth period used to be 
flexible, with the management commanding full authority over workforce restructuring. Employment 
also used to be short-term oriented. However, after the turning point toward labor shortages and 
especially since the 1980s, employment practices gradually became long term-oriented. With the 
democratization with the new government under the President Roh and after experiencing mass-scale 
labor strike in 1987, the power of labor unions became stronger and labor market turned into a very 
rigid one. However, this change was OK at least when the economy continued to grow as the 
businesses were always in need of more workers.  
 
Since the mid 1990s the economy started to slow down and fell into the crisis in 1997. With this turn 
of events, labor market flexibility, especially downsizing of workforce, emerged as one of the most 
serious issues in overall corporate restructuring. Actually it was early 1997 even before the onset of 
the crisis that first revision of the labor-related laws was made by the strong demand from the 
management side. However, it was right after the onset of the crisis, namely February 1998, that the 
revised law officially allowed the management the right to discharge the “redundant” workforce when 
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the companies are in bad situations. 
 
To examine the process of workforce restructuring, we take the case of an automobile company which 
experienced, first time as a big company, a large scale downsizing of workforce after the revised labor 
law came into practice. This was a very noteworthy case that attracted national and international 
attention given its scale. 
 
The company felt the need for workforce restructuring and initiated it since mid 1997 with the 
slowdown of domestic market. The company formally announced the downsizing plan in April 1998. 
The plan estimated about 40.6% (18,730 employees) of its workforce as redundant workforce as the 
firm was experiencing a 40% cut of production volume from the normal level. The company first 
started to invite three rounds of voluntary quit-off from April to June with a total of 4,455 workers 
filing for retirement. The initial response from the labor was that no single worker can be laid-off and 
work sharing combined with reduction of work hours should be introduced. As the bargaining 
between the management and labor did not reach agreement, the firm came up with the list of 2,678 
workers to be discharged in July 20, and soon issued the actual order of discharge to 1,538 workers on 
July 31. The labor unions responded with 6 rounds of strikes, occupation of work floor and sit-ins 
since July 20, 1998.  
 
Finally, the government decided to intervene in recognition of importance of this case, especially for 
international investors. With the intermediary role of the government, the both sides reached, on 
August 24, an agreement with lay-off of 277 workers and 2,018 workers given on-leave without pay 
as its core contents. This agreement of lay-off, though the numbers are small, was an important 
compromise from the labor side, in light of its initial position against any lay-off, and, on the other 
hand, reflection of the management’s strong will, given the symbolic meaning of involuntary lay-off, 
the first case of its kind in Korea. 
 
In sum, the company can be said to achieve its goal, although not solely by lay-off means, close to its 
original target of 10,166, if one include those separated in the form of retirement and on-leave without 
pay. The short run cost of this process from the management side amounted to roughly 1 billion US 
dollar worth cars of 100,000 units to be produced during the period of strikes, as well as minimum 
living subsidies to those on-leave without pay and one time complementary pay for those discharged 
and retired. Taking into these costs, net benefit of the whole plan of workforce downsizing is quite 
problematic. Moreover, as the company made a remarkable turn-around in 1999 even to the level of 
acquiring another major automobile company, the company recalled those who were on-leave without 
pay and those who were discharged. 
 
Also, if one knew such quick turn-around in advance, one doubts whether it really had to go through 
all the hassles that hurt both sides of the management and labor, in terms of not only monetary costs 
but also symbolic value of job security and loyalty. This makes one wonder why the both sides did not 
avoid the path toward mutual destruction or huge costs. As one of the most important reason for both 
sides not to reach agreement, we would like to point out the lack of transparency in the firm 
management and accounting matters. It is often observed that the management does not provide the 
labor side with sufficient information about the status of the company and tend to avoid huge profit 
from appearing in accounting books with a view to ward off the distribution demand from the labor 
side, and at the same time, to avoid losses, too, since they don’t want to be blamed (H. Cho 1999). As 
a matter of fact, the labor side argued that the accounting book showed a profit of 700 million Won 
but in reality the company (A automobile) made losses in 1997. It is widely broadcasted that the post-
bankruptcy investigation of the accounting books of two other major automobile companies revealed 
unbelievable degree of manipulation of the magnitude of several billion US dollars. 
Given this situation and practices, it is hard to blame the labor side not believing what is told by the 
management about the situation of the company. Since the accounting books are manipulated, it is 
meaningless to provide the labor side with the accounting information of the company and to demand 
such information. Thus, the labor unions had not choice but simply demand more from the other side, 
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regardless of the situation of the company (S. Cho 2002). Even when the company falls into troubles, 
the labor side perceives it as a fault of the management side, but feels that they are not responsible for 
it. So, in turn they feel furious when they have to be laid-off out of situation they are not responsible 
for (Bae 2000). 
 
At a more fundamental level, the issue of management transparency goes beyond the level of the 
labor-management conflict to the level of the top level governance. Only when a good corporate 
governance system is in place, one can expect transparent management and information disclosure to 
the labor side. Only after that, a more efficient and less costly bargaining between the labor and 
management can prevail. This story is indicative of the connected nature of the reforms, namely the 
linkage between the labor reform and corporate governance reform. 
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6. Comparative Implications and Lessons from the Reform 
 
1) Summary of the Findings 
 
The findings from the analyses in the preceding sections can be summarized as follows.  
 
First, our analysis confirms again that informal institutions take time to change or reform, implying 
that macroeconomic reform might be easier than microeconomic and institutional reforms.  We have 
thus found that reform tends to achieve some nominal success in terms of making new laws and 
several quantifiable targets (eg. debt-equity ratio, introduction of outside directors on the board, 
selling of banks to foreigners,), and to be more successful in areas where conflicts of interests are less 
acute (opening capital and M&A markets to foreigners). In contrast, reform tends to make little 
success or take more time in really changing institutional conventions, habits and beliefs, such as 
enhancing transparency in management or trust in labor relations. Then, the lesson is that any serious 
reform blueprint should take this point into account. Otherwise, reform will be not successful.  
 
The above observation is based on our recognition that fundamentals of the Korean economic system 
have not changed much, despite a series of reform measures that have had some success. In other 
words, the state is still a key presiding agency in the economy, big business is still controlled by the 
owner-families, major banks is now majority-owned by the state (thus the basis for state-led banking 
is reinforced), and the state still sets the industrial policies for next decades. But we still hear about 
incidences of illicit money dealings and manipulation of accounting books, and the role of the 
board/directors is still limited.  
 
Second, one source of the implementation difficulty in reform has to do with the institutional 
complementarity (Aoki and Okuno 1996) among the sectors. Because the character of one reform 
critically depends on the character of the others, we need to find a general equilibrium blueprint 
and/or take a proper sequence in reforms. One possible logical (maybe not practical) sequence seems 
to be moving from banking reform, corporate governance, labor relations, and then to finally business 
restructuring. The reasoning is as follows. To successfully carry out a banking reform, which involves 
write-offs of bad loans, debt restructuring, and prudential regulation, is directly linked to business 
restructuring and labor market reform. But going ahead with business restructuring encounters the 
difficulty associated with the owner-controlled nature of the Korean firms and corporate governance. 
Since the owner has a high stake in the firm owing to the opaque corporate governance allowing rents 
(private benefits) for controllers, the owner tends to resist inter-firm restructuring (M&A or sales) of 
firms under his/her control unless they pay a very high premium. In labor market reform, a low level 
of transparency in management and governance tends to interfere with the reform effort bringing in 
more flexibility in the labor market.  
 
Third, interest politics in the implementation stage, plus the complexities caused by democratization 
and globalization, are likely to cause weakening of state capability (or reform coalition) and 
implementation effectiveness and hence the distorted outcomes of the reform. For example, in labor 
relation reform, the new environment of globalization increases the need for flexibility. Thus, while 
the Korean companies desperately struggled to secure flexibility, they are now facing the much 
stronger labor unions. The outcome is not a fully flexible but segmented labor markets, divided 
between the core, unionized workers and unorganized periphery workers, and between the one over-
protected and the other under-protected, with substantial times wage rates differentials between them.  
 
Fourth, it is important to have an effective system of legislative bargaining necessary for disputing 
parties to negotiate. Only with this institutional vehicle, interest politics can lead to some reform 
consensus and not necessarily lead to reform failure. This is related to the hypothesis that it is very 
critical to have reform consensus, without which reform is more likely to be aborted or unsuccessful. 
We note that Korea tried to overhaul its financial system and conduct substantial financial 
liberalization but it was partly aborted and partly distorted, which paved the way for financial crisis 
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after 3 years. In the Korean case, real and strong consensus for reform arrived only after the 1997 
crisis as the crisis persuaded the society of the need for reform. However, as he used to be a political 
outsider, the President Kim Daejung lacked brain pool and decided to make old guard (elite 
bureaucrats) his people by entrusting them with key posts for reform.  The crisis brought back the 
state and its autonomy revived to the front as the banks, labor unions, chaebols all staying in back 
yard. The bureaucrats joined reform since neo-liberal idea was not threatening their interests and their 
power rather enlarged. The outcome was the quick implementation of one of the most comprehensive 
reform but doing new thins in old ways.  
 
Fifth, reform process tends to involve tension between global standard and local ideas and interests 
(specificity) which often become sources for the mixed results or new conflicts. Most reform, 
especially those started from the external pressure, tend to be under pressure to introduce more 
elements from the Anglo-Saxon model or global standards. Then, the difficulties arise from the fact 
that while some elements of the global standards are really necessary and needed ones while some 
others are not, and also the fact that interests conflicts and related bargaining process add another 
complexities such that good elements are often blocked or distorted. 
 
In the corporate governance reform, while the main agency cost problem in the Anglo-Saxon model 
of the firm is that of the hired management, in the Korean chaebols it is the agency costs between the 
controlling shareholders and the minor non-controlling shareholders.  Then the right focus of the 
reform should have been to strengthen the right of the minority shareholders but the initial focus of 
the reform following the Anglo-Saxon model used up its energy in introducing outside directors in the 
board. We have also discussed the case of the regulation against the inter-firm equity investment in 
the business groups which was abolished to follow the global standards but late re-imposed partly in 
reflection of the interest of bureaucrats. This revival of the investment restriction signifies the reversal 
of the global standards by the bureaucrats.  
 
In labor market reforms, we had a hard time in striking an optimum balance between the labor market 
flexibility and loss of firm-specific skill and trust.  The massive layoffs was felt more serious hurt to 
the Korean workers than to the workers in the American-type economy as they used to live under the 
different social contract. The dynamism of the Korean employment used to be based on commitment 
comparable to family. But economic crisis and restructuring has destroyed the myth of family-like 
life-long engagement. Furthermore, layoffs deprived of the contextual knowledge from workers. One 
pre-condition for labor flexibility is life-time education and retraining system, such as community 
colleges and vocational schools in the USA, which lacked in Korea. Without this, layoff workers 
would find it more difficult to acquire new skills and new jobs, and thus they would resist strongly 
against possible layoffs.  
 
2) Current Korea, a Tamed Tiger? 
 
The reform in Korean was one of the most comprehensively and decisively implemented reform. As 
of now after 7 years after the break of the crisis, many are concerned about the long term vitality of 
the economy, balancing the benefits against the cost of the reform. While the reform has brought the 
Korean firm into more stable, profitable, transparent state of the business, the national economy is 
now suffering from weak investment, slow growth and slow job creation and rising unemployment 
again. Some critics like Chang and Shin (2002) argues that such situation is the price the economy has 
paid in replacing the old catch-up model not by a new catch-up model but by the Anglo-Saxon model 
which is suitable only for developed economies. Then, a valid question is whether our response (the 
blueprint) was right, namely the possibility of wrong blueprint as noted in Fanelli (2003).   
 
Our reflection is that the post-crisis Korea just tried to be more market or Anglo-Saxon model 
oriented but without paying attention to growth and competitiveness. For instance, banks were sold to 
foreigners who are basically conservative and focusing on consumer lending rather than industrial 
banking. While the firms are required to lower their debt ratio, they are not reaching out to borrow 
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and make investment.  The point is that while the Korean economy should continue to growth with 
aggressive investment, the firms have stopped doing that with one of lowest debt-equity ratio in the 
world, now about 100%.  
 
The issue of wrong or right blueprint underscores the need to define the reform goal correctly. The 
goals of reform should not just be a movement toward market-oriented economic system but toward a 
growth-oriented one/ or pro-growth market-oriented one. The final criteria for success should be 
whether it is able to enhance the long term growth potential and competitiveness of the economy, 
which is the ultimate safe guard against possibility for anther crisis. The firms had better be 
encouraged to pursue long term growth than short term profitability. The Korea tigers look tamed on 
the surface, like an Anglo-Saxon tigers, but in the heart they still want/need to grow. Along this line of 
thought, we can identify three sub-goals of the reform, and that should be 1) creating jobs, 2) boosting 
new firms, and 3) reaching new markets, as they are most consistent with the long term growth.   
 
This is based on the recognition that the real engine of the quick recovery after the crisis originated 
from the strong and wide birth of small scale venture companies in the economy as the financial and 
human resources were released from the tight grip of the big business (Lee and Kim 2000). Also 
during the take off period in the 1960s and 70s, the growth was not owing to the balance between the 
state and market but to the emergence of new firms, namely the chaebols.  
 
The reasoning goes further to point out one missing block in reform agenda.  That is reform and 
reinvestment of education/human capital system which is one of the most fundamental and vital 
element for sustainable growth. The recent rise of unemployment also has to with the low quality of 
college education in Korea, which does not afford to meet the challenge of globalized labor markets. 
In other words, while low-skill jobs are now moved to China and others, Korean workers are not 
skilled enough to be welcomed by high end jobs which are globally sourced. 
 
3) Back to the Why, What, and Why Questions 
 
Now let us conclude with the response to the three “W” questions raised in Fanelli (2003) taking into 
account the Korean experiences with the reform. 
 
First, why were some countries able to undertake reform while others were not? Regarding this 
question, we realize that for the reform to be undertaken, conflicting interests should be negotiated 
and coordinated to form a reform coalition by strong leadership, external pressure, or dispute-settling 
institutions. Without this, no reform can start.  
 
Second, what factors enabled some countries to successfully implement their reform program while 
the program failed in others? Our recognition is that it has first to do with the quality of the blueprint. 
The reform design or blueprint should be comprehensive taking into account institutional 
complementarities and take a proper sequencing being aware of the impact lags, so that the reform 
may be pursued enough long time.  
 
Third, why were some reforms more successful at delivering the expected outcomes than others.  In 
this regards, we would like to emphasize the correct handling of conflicting goals and ideas to 
reconcile the tension between the global and local standards.  The leadership should identify the 
correct reform goal first, and then study the initial conditions (local specificities) of your country to 
write a good blueprint suitable for the goal, keeping in mind that global standards often suitable only 
for developed countries (eg. bias for profitability against growth). 
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Table 4-1: Macroeconomic Indicators, Korea: 1993-2002 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Real GDP (percent change) 5.5 8.3 8.9 6.8 5.0 -6.7 10.9 9.3 3.1 6.3 
Final domestic demand 5.7 8.4 9.5 7.3 1.2 -13.8 7.4 7.7 2.5 5.8 
Consumption 5.4 7.1 8.2 7.2 3.2 -10.1 9.4 6.7 3.7 6.2 
Gross fixed investment 6.3 10.7 11.9 7.3 -2.2 -21.2 3.7 11.4 -1.8 4.8 
Saving and Investment (in percent of GDP) 
Gross national saving 36.2 35.5 35.5 33.8 33.4 33.9 32.9 32.4 29.9 29.2 
Gross domestic investment 35.4 36.5 37.3 38.1 34.4 21.3 26.9 28.3 26.8 26.1 
Prices (percent change) 
Consumer prices (average) 4.8 6.3 4.5 4.9 4.4 7.5 0.8 2.3 4.1 2.7 
Consumer price (end-period) 5.8 5.6 4.8 4.9 6.6 4.0 1.4 2.8 3.2 3.7 
GDP deflator 7.0 7.6 7.2 3.9 3.2 5.0 -2.0 -1.1 1.3 1.7 
Employment and wages 
Unemployment rate 2.8 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.6 6.8 6.3 4.1 3.7 3.1 
Wages, manufacturing 
(annual percent change) 10.9 15.5 9.9 12.2 5.2 -3.1 14.9 8.6 5.8 12.0 
Consolidated government (in percent of GDP) 
Revenues 18.6 19.1 19.3 20.4 20.6 21.8 22.4 26.0 26.4 26.6 
Expenditure 18.3 18.7 19.0 20.2 22.1 26.0 25.1 24.8 25.1 22.9 
Balance 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 -1.5 -4.2 -2.7 1.3 1.3 3.7 
Money and credit (end of period) 
M3 19.0 24.7 19.1 16.7 13.9 12.5 8.0 7.1 11.6 13.6 
Yield on corporate bonds 12.6 12.9 13.8 11.9 13.4 15.0 8.9 9.3 7.0 6.56 
Trade (percent change) 
Export volume 14.5 13.6 22.3 17.4 14.8 19.2 12.0 20.6 0.7 14.9 
Import volume 6.1 22.5 24.1 15.6 2.0 -25.1 29.0 19.0 -2.3 16.4 
Terms of trade -1.6 3.4 1.2 -9.5 -2.6 -4.5 -2.2 -12.4 -4.5 -0.6 
Balance of payments (in billions of U.S. dollars)  
Exports, fob 82.1 95.0 124.6 130.0 138.6 132.1 145.2 175.9 151.4 162.5 
Imports, fob 79.8 97.8 129.1 144.9 141.8 90.5 116.8 159.1 138.0 152.1 
Current account balance 1.0 -3.9 -8.5 -23.0 -8.3 40.4 24.5 12.2 8.2 6.1 
Current account balance 
(in percent of GDP) 0.3 -1.0 -1.7 -4.4 -1.7 12.7 6.0 2.7 2.0 1.3 
Usable gross reserves  
In billions of U.S. dollars 
(end of period) 18.3 22.4 29.4 29.4 8.9 48.5 74.1 96.2 102.8 121.4 
In months of imports of goods 
and services 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.3 0.7 6.5 7.6 7.1 8.7 8.2 
External debt  
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In billions of U.S. dollars 43.9 97.4 127.5 163.5 159.2 148.7 137.1 131.7 118.8 131.0 
In percent of GDP 12.7 24.2 26.0 31.4 33.4 46.8 33.8 28.5 27.9 27.5 
Exchange rate (period average)  
Won per U.S. dollar 802.7 803.4 771.0 804.8 951.1 1398.9 1189.5 1130.6 1290.8 1251.2 
Nominal effective exchange 
rate (1995=100, W/$) 100.4 100.5 100.0 98.7 108.0 144.7 131.1 123.3 132.6 n.a. 
Real effective exchange rate 
(1995=100, W/$) 102.9 100.9 100.0 97.9 106.8 133.7 122.3 114.6 121.7 n.a. 
 
Sources: Pyo (2004); The Bank of Korea, Principal Economic Indicators & National Accounts (2002). 
Notes. 1. Excluding privatization receipts 
2. Prior to 2000, the civil service pension is excluded 
3. Including government guaranteed restructuring bonds issued by KDIC and KAMCO 
4. Excluding deposits at overseas branches and subsidiaries of domestic banks 
5. Including offshore borrowing of domestic financial institutions and debt contracted  
  by overseas branches of domestic financial institutions. 
 46
Table 4-2. Reform of Capital and Business Structure and the Outcomes 
 
<Part A. Debt/equity ratio - Simple Average > 
6th-30th   chaebols Debt/equity 
Ratio* 
top 5 
chaebols 6th–10th 11th–20th 21th–30th 6th–30th 
top 30 
chaebols 
2002 end 177.14% 135.95% 353.61% 232.78% 261.75% 247.65% 
2001 end      171.19% 
2000 end 253.21% 193.42% 707.33% 57.94% 344.79% 329.53% 
1999 end 212.02% 234.21% 330.55% 627.53% 430.07% 393.73% 
1998 end 335.00%    497.70%  
1997 end 472.90%    616.80%  
< Part B. Gross Debt - Simple average >  
6th-30th   chaebols Gross Debt 
(Tril. Won)* 
top 5 
chaebols 6th–10th 11th–20th 21th–30th 6th–30th 
top 30 
chaebols 
2002 end 56.93 13.64 11.04 3.92 8.55 16.61 
2001 end       
2000 end 51.01 10.98 6.03 2.71 5.69 13.24 
1999 end 47.02 13.19 5.37 3.87 6.33 13.11 
1998 end 46.91    5.30  
1997 end 44.27    5.46  
< Part C. Net Profit or losses - Simple average > 
6th-30th   chaebols Net Profit or 
losses 
(Tril. Won)* 
top 5 
chaebols 6th–10th 11th–20th 21th–30th 6th–30th 
top 30 
chaebols 
2002 end 4.67 0.97 0.11 0.10 0.28 1.01 
2001 end       
2000 end 1.08 0.35 -0.15 -0.23 -0.08 0.11 
1999 end** 1.68 -3.96 0.14 -0.39 -0.90 -0.47 
1998 end      -19.5 
1997 end      -3.2 
* Net profit = (Revenue - Cost) - Interest – Tax = Operating profit - Interest - Tax 
          = Ordinary profit – Tax 
< Part D. Net profit/sales - Simple average >  
6th-30th   chaebols Net  
Profit/sales* 
top 5 
chaebols 6th–10th 11th–20th 21th–30th 6th–30th 
top 30 
chaebols 
2002 end 6.69% 5.81% 3.04% 1.14% 2.83% 3.48% 
2001 end       
2000 end 1.06% 2.16% -2.01% -20.12% -8.42% -6.84% 
1999 end** 2.97% -16.74% 3.41% -19.21% -9.67% -7.56% 
1998 end -3.30%    -7.90% -4.50% 
1997 end 0.00%    -2.00% -0.80% 
Source: Korean Fair Trade Commission (released April each year) 
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<Table 4-3> Unemployment Rate by Age Group 
Age Group Time 
 
Unemployment 
rate(%) 15-19 
Years old 
20-29 
Years old 
30-39 
Years old 
40-49 
Years old 
50-59 
Years old 
60 Years 
old & over 
1990 2.4 9.2 4.9 1.6 1.2 1.1 0.4 
1991 2.4 9.3 4.9 1.3 1.2 0.9 0.3 
1992 2.5 10.2 5.3 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.4 
1993 2.9 11.0 6.3 1.8 1.2 1.0 0.4 
1994 2.5 9.3 5.4 1.6 1.3 0.8 0.3 
1995 2.1 7.9 4.3 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.4 
1996 2.0 7.4 4.4 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.4 
1997 2.6 9.8 5.3 1.9 1.5 1.2 0.8 
1998 7.0 20.8 11.4 5.7 5.6 5.3 2.4 
1999 6.3 19.5 10.1 5.3 5.2 5.1 2.3 
2000 4.1 13.8 7.1 3.4 3.3 2.9 1.3 
2001 3.8 13.3 7.0 3.0 2.8 2.6 1.1 
2002 3.1 11.1 6.3 2.8 1.9 1.8 1.0 
 
Source: Statistical Office of Korea, Yearbooks of Labor Statistics (various years) 
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Table 4-4 Results of Corporate Governance Survey in Asia 
 
< Part A. Overall Scores >  
2002 2001 Change from 2001 Countries 
Ranking Score Ranking   Score Ranking   Score 
 Singapore 1 65.4 1 64.5 0 0.9 
 Hong Kong  2 64.4 2 62.9 0 1.5 
 Malaysia 3 64.1 3 56.6 0 7.5 
 India 4 62.2 4 55.6 0 6.6 
 Korea 5 62.0 8 47.1 3 14.9 
 Thailand 6 60.0 5 55.1 -1 4.9 
 Taiwan 7 59.2 6 54.6 -1 4.6 
 China 8 50.8 7 49.1 -1 1.7 
 Philippines 9 44.0 9 43.9 0 0.1 
 Indonesia 10 38.2 10 37.3 0 0.9 
Source: CLSA (2001 and 2002); recited from Jang, Ha-Sung(2003)  
 
< Part B. Rank by Areas >  
2001 2002 Changes in Ranking from 2001 to 2002 Korea Ranking in Asia 10 
5 8 3 
Discipline 6 8 2 
Transparency 1 8 7 
Independence 7 4 -3 
Accountability 2 4 2 
Responsibility 7 8 1 
Fairness 7 9 2 
Ranking 
Survey 
Questions  
Social awareness 2 4 2 
Source : CLSA 2001 and 2002; recited from Jang, Ha-Sung(2003) 
 
 
Table 4-5: Ranking for Competitiveness and Corporate Governance, 2002 
 
< Part A. IMD Survey > 
Country Country Competitiveness 
Corporate 
Boards 
Shareholder 
Value 
Insider 
Trading 
Rights and 
Responsibilities 
Korea 27 41 39 36 40 
Source : IMD 2002; recited from Jang, Ha-Sung(2003)  
 
< Part B. WEF Survey > 
Country Ranking 
Competitiveness Corporate Boards Korea 
28 61 
Source : WEF 2002; recited from Jang, Ha-Sung(2003) 
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Table 4-6: Changes in Economic Efficiency since the Reform 
                                                          (unit : %) 
Private Firms  Period 
Sub total 30 chaebols Non-chaebols 
1996/1997 2.8 2.4 2.8 
1997/1998 2.4 1.8 2.4 
1998/1999 2.3 1.6 2.4 
1999/2000 2.1 1.2 2.1 
Total factor 
Productivity  
Change 
 
Whole period 2.4 1.7 2.4 
1996/1997 2.3 1.7 2.3 
1997/1998 2.1 1.5 2.1 
1998/1999 1.8 1.2 1.9 
1999/2000 1.5 0.8 1.5 
Technological 
Change 
Whole period 2.0 1.5 2.1 
1996/1997 0.161 0.330 0.150 
1997/1998 -0.034 -0.020 -0.034 
1998/1999 0.125 0.059 0.129 
1999/2000 0.204 0.026 0.215 
Scale  
Efficiency 
Change 
Whole period 1.114 0.099 0.115 
1996/1997 0.363 0.350 0.364 
1997/1998 0.361 0.349 0.362 
1998/1999 0.360 0.347 0.361 
1999/2000 0.358 0.345 0.359 
Technical 
Efficiency 
Change 
 
Whole period 0.360 0.348 0.361 
Note: Total factor productivity change = technological Change = scale efficiency change + change in 
technical efficiency. Technological change measure the change in the frontier production function, 
and technical efficiency measures the distance from the production frontier.  
 
Source: S. Park (2003).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
